Forums → WEPR → Brain in a Petri dish

Does it have rights, all of them?

What if the scientists don't find out? They may truly be hurting a new creature without even knowing it. And who is to decide whether this creature deserves some form of communication in the end?

On the other hand, I cannot help but wonder, even if that creature does develop a conscience, how can anyone know if the communication issue is not addressed properly? A brain grown in a lab will probably not be able to communicate with the scientists (except our good ol' @Moegreche , who can tell us how it feels . he is a living example ), unless if they know in advance that it will form a conscience, which makes for another couple of interesting scenarios:

If they do and don't allow the "brain" some form of communication their actions might be deemed immoral, but can anyone say that it is different than, for example, animal testing? Why would anyone be ok with the one but not the other? It does have great research potential after all

On the other hand, knowing in advance and allowing the brain to "speak" may advance the research program greatly, but will also have different ethical repercussions depending on the rest of their actions. What if it is in huge pain literally or otherwise ever since it was grown? What if this creature "asks" to be killed, even though its scientific value is so massive?

The issue of the soul. Would you believe that that brain has a soul, or is it just a biological machine formed from human cells to you?

I used to think that all conscience, emotions, personality, everything that we call soul of a person was its brain, but recently I've found out it's not true. And not in the reflexes sense of the word. Emotions are truly linked to primary body organs like, most importantly, the heart. But not just through the automatic reaction of BPM acceleration/decceleration. The heart and other organs actually do play a part on what we feel and how we feel it. They are linked to the brain in many more ways than originally thought.

In conclusion: The issue goes really deep both ethically and scientifically, with a million interesting questions and scenarios . I don't have a real opinion on it, since there are so many variables to control... One may be moral and the other may be not...one may be of great scientific value and the other of far greater...Who can tell which is which?

- Is it a person? Is it human?

- Does it have rights, all of them?

- Is it moral to keep it alive or is it potentially suffering psychologically?

Would you believe that that brain has a soul, or is it just a biological machine formed from human cells to you?

What if it is in huge pain literally or otherwise ever since it was grown?

Emotions are truly linked to primary body organs like, most importantly, the heart.

- Is it a person? Is it human?
- Does it have rights, all of them?

This is an interesting discussion for me because of its legal implications. It brings up the issue of legal personality, which is one of the basis why we have legal rights and obligations. Importantly, a person is recognised under law generally, not because we are human, but because rights and duties are ascribed to them. Hence corporations have been granted limited personhood, because they have some legal rights and responsibilities that natural persons have, including the right to sue or be sued, the right to form commercial contracts, the right to own property, the responsibility to pay taxes, etc.

What I feel is pertinent would depend on whether the brain in a vat can communicate and commit any action. If it can, then surely it needs to be granted personhood of some sort, because if not, then it cannot be held liable for legal responsibilities, nor can it be protected by legal rights enjoyed by the rest of us. In a hypothetical scenario, if the brain is able to speak via an advanced form of communicator. Should its words be subjected to the same level of legal constrain that we do? Should we be able to hold it liable for defamation? Hate speech? Negligence stemming from its speech? Conversely speaking, if someone kills the brain, it would require legal personhood, if we want to convict the offender of a crime against the brain, say homicide.

If we feel that that these scenarios when applied to the brain should have the same implications as those currently applied to natural persons, then the brain should be given a form of legal personhood.

What I feel is pertinent would depend on whether the brain in a vat can communicate and commit any action. If it can, then surely it needs to be granted personhood of some sort, [...]

That would mandate that nearly all mammals and birds, and numerous cephalapods, be granted some form of legal personhood, and unless I'm horribly misinformed, that hasn't actually happened.

I should have been clearer - Communicate in the way a natural person would, including formation of complex thoughts, such that you would treat and interact with the brain as a normal person, albeit without the rest of a body. Communication that is distinct from that of animals, with all the complexity, lexicon, flexibility and creativity that has gone into the formation of human languages over the years.

-Of course not. If for no other reason, it is a brain. It was not born, it was made. Since one must either be born in a country (or take a citizenship test, etc), it doesn't have rights.

That's not exactly true. Corporations have some form of rights, but that doesn't hinge upon the idea of citizenship. I don't think it's entirely far-fetched that some form of person-hood has to be conferred on brains-in-a-vat in certain scenarios.

Communicate in the way a natural person would, including formation of complex thoughts, such that you would treat and interact with the brain as a normal person, albeit without the rest of a body. Communication that is distinct from that of animals, with all the complexity, lexicon, flexibility and creativity that has gone into the formation of human languages over the years.

So, a legal person must communicate in a way that satisfies an arbitrarily defined set of conditions that, by a strange coincidence, happens to exclude everything that is of a species other than human. I must therefore question your assertion that this is "not because we are human".

I think arbitrary is a wrong and harsh choice of wording here - Being human as an initial basis for natural personhood, (one of the types of legal personality currently) is not a random choice, but simply because we are humans.

However, there are other subsets of legal personhoods, such as corporations (Decided in I think, Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad), or international bodies being granted legal personhood, hence my assertion that we do not need to be human to do so. I think at a deeper and more fundamental level other than being human, legal personhood is grounded in concepts such as responsibility and accountability. I'm not able to specifically pin down the concept, but I feel that responsibility and accountability are reasonable starting points.

I brought in the example of a brain being able to communicate as a human, because I feel that if a brain can do so consciously, then it needs to be bound by our laws, as it needs to be held responsible and accountable for its actions. So granting it personhood does not stem from the fact that it has to be human.

For example, if the brain expresses hate speech voluntarily then it cannot be prosecuted under our current laws, because it is essentially a non-person. If that is the case, then it needs to be given the status of some form of legal personhood, because much of our law rests on that necessity for personhood. Hence, on the whole, I still feel that it's not merely the fact that we are humans that grants us legal personhood (although it has for natural personhood), but a deeper concept. I do not feel that my assertion is hence wrong.

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Separately, I think another point to highlight is that such a hypothetical form of personhood may not subscribe all rights and obligations to the brain-in-a-vat as those applied to natural persons. It would depend on the circumstances. Corporations are not extended equal protection or rights or obligations, but mostly those that relate to commercial activities such as the right to make contracts.

I think arbitrary is a wrong and harsh choice of wording here - Being human as an initial basis for natural personhood, (one of the types of legal personality currently) is not a random choice, but simply because we are humans.

However, there are other subsets of legal personhoods, such as corporations (Decided in I think, Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad), or international bodies being granted legal personhood, [...]

I brought in the example of a brain being able to communicate as a human, because I feel that if a brain can do so consciously, then it needs to be bound by our laws, as it needs to be held responsible and accountable for its actions.

For example, if the brain expresses hate speech voluntarily then it cannot be prosecuted under our current laws, because it is essentially a non-person. If that is the case, then it needs to be given the status of some form of legal personhood, because much of our law rests on that necessity for personhood.

Right, so it must conform to a cunningly defined set of conditions that, by its very design, selectively excludes everything that is of a species other than human. I must therefore again question your assertion that this is "not because we are human".

All of which are owned, maintained, and controlled by humans.

Yes, but not because they are humans, but because they have characteristics that humans can display. Human would mean to the law in this case, a biological human. A corporation is no more a biological human than an animal is, yet it can be and has to be granted legal personhood, because it has characteristics (responsibility and accountability are two), that would necessarily put it within the ambit of the law. Entities do not need to be biologically human to be granted legal personhood.

Why do you place that particular requirement upon legal culpability? Why that and not the ability to construct artificial tools, or recognize one's own reflection?

I approached legal culpability in this fashion only because of the hypothetical situation I put forward. I think hypothetical situations would help, because it would be impossible to formulate and predict all the rights that a brain-in-a-vat should be granted if it has to be granted some.

As mentioned depend on the circumstances. If in another hypothetical situation, the brain-in-the-vat has the use of a mechanical body and can create artificial tools, then the set of rights and obligations that personhood should attribute to it must shift, in order to cover it under the law. For example, if the brain starts to create tools and decides to sell them, then commercial and manufacturing laws would have to be considered as well, to cover it.

I don't see how the law applying only to people mandates giving a non-person personhood. The fact that there are laws against people committing certain acts should not make it necessary for anything that commits them to be tried as a person.

Legal fictions are important to the working of our law, or at least are so under common law systems. Such legal fictions are essential, because they easily help to get around seemingly contradicting and constraining laws, and enable the courts to still push forward positive public policies. Common law systems are incrementally built upon cases acting as precedents over the centuries; unfortunately with great societal changes, laws which have taken centuries to develop, may suddenly fail in their reach and sufficiency.

The most prominent example of legal fictions is corporate personhood. Before the Industrial Revolution, most businesses were owned by a small group of people; commercial laws could have treated them as individuals. However after businesses began to grow rapidly and mushroom into corporations, a problem arose. Do laws tailored for individuals apply to corporations? Every law thus far had been written to address the conduct of individuals. If the courts had not used the convenient route of the legal fiction of corporate person-hood, they would have been faced with painstaking editing of hundreds of Acts, thousands of laws, to take into account corporations. For example, it was taken that only a person could pay taxes or be held liable for debt. Corporations tried to sneak around the law by arguing they were not persons, as defined then. Obviously this would have to be stamped down upon. Hence the legal fiction of treating corporations as legal persons (but only to a certain extent), to circumvent the problem, and enable the continuing application of current law.

Of course legal fictions should not be used freely and in a lax fashion. Anything that can be easily achieved by the courts with legal fiction, should be dealt with by straightforward legislation if legislation cover the problem as easily. Legal fictions can, if not used wisely, bring more harm than good.

Entities do not need to be biologically human to be granted legal personhood.

I approached legal culpability in this fashion only because of the hypothetical situation I put forward. I think hypothetical situations would help, because it would be impossible to formulate and predict all the rights that a brain-in-a-vat should be granted if it has to be granted some.

Legal fictions are important to the working of our law, or at least are so under common law systems. Such legal fictions are essential, because they easily help to get around seemingly contradicting and constraining laws, and enable the courts to still push forward positive public policies. Common law systems are incrementally built upon cases acting as precedents over the centuries; unfortunately with great societal changes, laws which have taken centuries to develop, may suddenly fail in their reach and sufficiency.

The non-human part of a corporation is a title and some inanimate property claims. These entities, to the best of my knowledge, cannot act of their own volition, make or use tools, communicate in any way, or even think. How, then, do you justify disallowing living beings capable of doing all of these to some extent while permitting entities that are, if not human, purely artificial?

It is indeed true that a corporation as an entity in the purest sense of the word cannot think by itself. Hence there is still a human element to it, that is, all the individuals together are treated as a single entity acting in concert. But again, that is not to say that the corporation is treated as a natural person or human being. A title is can no more enter into a contract than a human hand as part of a human being, enter into a contract. The parts of a corporation have to be considered as a whole in order to qualify legal personhood. But it is also important to remember that a corporation is much more than just an association of people.

I would consider the question on disallowing living beings capable of limited human-like actions as a separate issue from granting "artificial" entities legal personhood. I would exclude animals from the equation of legal person-hood totally, even if they can think in a limited rudimentary way, make tools, communicate, etc that corresponds with what humans can do. But the scope of these activities seem a pale shadow of what humans can do. There are higher standard of self-consciousness which constitutes personhood that even ''artificial'' entities like corporations (taking into account its human elements) possess, which other living things such as animals do not. An ape can certainly make a tool for digging out termites, but can it make the tool not for such a purpose for itself, but for the purpose of sale, on a repeated basis?

This looks an awful lot like an appeal to consequences.

That's legal fiction for you. Lots of legal theorists and jurists have railed against legal fictions, most famously Bentham (Legal fictions are "wilful falsehoods&quot. But that is to simply circumvent all the nuances of the various types of legal fictions and boil them down to falsehoods. But that is not in the realm of our discussion I feel.

I think what is more pertinent is that the consequences of not resorting to such fictions with regard to personhood, would be far far worse than actually using it. Legal functions serve normative functions which are much more important than a strict approach of shooting down arguments simply for slight fallacies.

This has real world repercussions that can affect anybody. Say you buy a car from a car company, which fails in its purported safety features leading to serious injuries for a person. If corporations aren't legal persons, who does the victim sue? Does it sue the team that built the car physically? The engineers who designed it? The supplier of the parts? The boardroom? Giving a corporation, an "artificial" entity legal personhood makes it far easier to sue for damages.

There are higher standard of self-consciousness which constitutes personhood that even ''artificial'' entities like corporations (taking into account its human elements) possess, which other living things such as animals do not.

An ape can certainly make a tool for digging out termites, but can it make the tool not for such a purpose for itself, but for the purpose of sale, on a repeated basis?

This has real world repercussions that can affect anybody. Say you buy a car from a car company, which fails in its purported safety features leading to serious injuries for a person. If corporations aren't legal persons, who does the victim sue? Does it sue the team that built the car physically? The engineers who designed it? The supplier of the parts?

No, there aren't. You have no way of even supporting that claim. Worse still, you close the door on any humans who do not currenly possess such a consciousness.

I'm no expert on animal biology, but I'm pretty certain that there is a nebulous concept regarding higher brain function that separates us from non-humans, and that has led us to become a civilisation and more importantly, to require laws to govern us, whilst animals do not. I think brains-in-a-vat come under such an ambit as well.

Furthermore, just because some humans lack this "consciousness", such as mentally challenged people, does not mean the rest of us have to be judged at that level.

1 Who would buy it? There needs to be a market for termite-picks, and the presence or absence of a market does not determine the "self-consciousness" of the prospective termite-pick seller.
2 What would it be bought with? Food? I'm certain that an ape with easy access to materials would be willing to exchange the finished product for a valuable commodity like food.

I am not using the termite tool example as an example of market presence. I am using it as an example of complexity of thought, the vague nebulous idea I mentioned earlier, as a separation that divides us and other humans, and which presumably, makes it necessary that we and the human brain-in-a-vat (Which I presume to have all the cognitive ability of a normal human with a body), be treated under the law. I don't think your response touches upon that issue, rather it nitpicks at the example without going anywhere. Apes do not set up businesses that deal with commercial transactions which require complex sets of laws to regulate, only humans do. That was the main focus of my hypo, not what another ape might exchange one single termite tool for.

Any or all of the above are indictable in the absence of an overarching legal entity, but that's skirting the issue. If someone builds and programs a robot assassin and sets it loose on a killing spree, there is no need for the robot to be tried as a legal person. Similarly, I see no need for a lab-grown disembodied brain to be tried as a legal or natural person for espousing hate speech.

A crime is only indictable because of criminal law, which makes very liberal usage, and is indeed based upon charging "persons", of which the brain-in-a-vat cannot be considered, because it isn't a legal person. In fact, there are very clear legal rules stipulated that govern indictments, such as the Indictment Rules 1971 (UK). For me, it's not a skirting point, but the central issue. Such rules only come into play because it's based upon ''persons''. I'm not even sure how the idea that indictments and indictable offences can occur without "an overarching legal entity" popped up.

A robot assassin presumably has no consciousness of its own, as it has to be programmed. It seems no different from other tools we have used to kill people. Our discussion on the other hand, is centered on a brain that has full cognitive functions, and is as self-conscious as any human brain is. The only difference from a normal human, is that the brain does not have a body. At least that is how I've been approaching my side of the discussion; perhaps we differ here.

Side-note, indictment also only covers crimes, not tort, which is the basis of the example I provided.

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On the whole, my concern with such a hypothetical human brain-in-a-vat is that there will be legal implications if a brain can commit what would be considered criminal offences, or torts if a normal human does, but not when it does, because current laws give no scope to such subjects.

I'm no expert on animal biology, but I'm pretty certain that there is a nebulous concept regarding higher brain function that separates us from non-humans, and that has led us to become a civilisation and more importantly, to require laws to govern us, whilst animals do not.

Apes do not set up businesses that deal with commercial transactions which require complex sets of laws to regulate, only humans do. That was the main focus of my hypo, not what another ape might exchange one single termite tool for.

Our discussion on the other hand, is centered on a brain that has full cognitive functions, and is as self-conscious as any human brain is. The only difference from a normal human, is that the brain does not have a body.

Side-note, indictment also only covers crimes, not tort, which is the basis of the example I provided.