Sorry for the slow response, Zahz. I knew responding to your post would take a fair chunk of time, so here we go. I'm going to have to take it piece by piece because there are a lot of moving parts.
Essentially I'm arguing that the value system inherent in any consequentialist theory is itself deontology
Okay, so a clear thesis - but one that is trivially false since deontology isn't a value system, it's a complete ethical theory. But perhaps you mean to say that consequentialist theories will slide into deontological ones so that there is no principled means of discriminating between the 2. Let's see what happens.
Why then are the consequences of the act good or ill? Essentially because we all just agree that they are.
Ah! Now I get it! So this is what we might call the hinge claim of your argument. I'll get into this a bit more later, but it's a claim that 1) neither camp would agree with, and 2) begs the question you're trying to prove.
Now I'm as against allowing popular opinion to influence theory as the next guy, but we're in moral philosophy so that's a reasonable way to attempt access to the nature of the consequence.
This ties into your hinge argument from earlier, so let's look at it closer. It looks like you're taking on moral relativism - a broad collection of views that states that there is no objective right or wrong. More formally, the moral relativist says that statement about whether action x is right are not objectively true or false - their truth value is respective to something else (e.g. majority opinion, culture, etc.).
The problem with this approach is that the theories under consideration are objectivist - there is a correct answer to ethical questions that is independent of what we think about them. This also means that certain acts fall into those 4 categories - not because we say they do - but because of some objective reason.
Now, you're more than welcome to argue against moral objectivism. You're even free to argue that the notion of ethical value is illusory (some people have). But there are some very serious issues with this approach (which we can discuss if you like).
A good act is a good act because shut up.
Haha! It's a shut up! I like it. But this isn't quite deontology - acts are wrong just because we (or the theory) say so. That would be a deeply unsatisfying ethical theory. For deontologists, acts are wrong because they violate some duty or because they go against our instrumental rationality (the specific answer depends on the theory). But notice this is now an open question - does action X violate a duty? What happens when duties conflict? Compare this to the closed question of 'action x is wrong because shut up'.
we just do not have a reliable way to access the nature of any moral object either action or consequence.
This, I think, is your strongest point and represent a very genuine problem for both camps. We don't have direct access to others' mental states, so trying to assess duties or maxims in play (in actual cases) is a challenge for the deontologist. Similarly, trying to determine all the consequences of an act is nearly impossible - there could be long-term unforeseen consequences that no one could have anticipated.
Even in our doctor example, a consequentialist could argue that we shouldn't slice up the traveller. This is because doing so would have the consequence of the doctor possibly losing his license to practice medicine, people might distrust the medical community as a whole, and so on.
The main thing to keep in mind is that the problems for each are distinct - although they can be very devastating. It's for these reasons (and others) that we don't see too many strict consequentialists or deontologists running around (Peter Singer comes to mind, though).
The upshot is that concerns like this one have motivated a move to other approaches to ethical matters. Virtue ethics and contract theories are just 2 examples of an attempt to get out of the hole dug by consequentialism and deontology.
