So, here's something I've concluded. If we start with the idea that everything, from physical events to our thoughts, has been and will be caused by the action of something else, we can extrapolate the entirety of the history of the universe and it's contents could be predicted by the conditions of it's creation. Thus, an omniscient God will know every decision every human will make in their lifetime, and will have in turn caused them to happen as a result of his creation of the universe. Therefore, from God's perspective, free will does not actually exist, since all human interaction is a product of God. Therefore, God judging a human for his actions is not a valid judgement. Thoughts?
If we start with the idea that everything, from physical events to our thoughts, has been and will be caused by the action of something else, we can extrapolate the entirety of the history of the universe and it's contents could be predicted by the conditions of it's creation.
That assumes a creation event, which is not in any way necessary or even deterministically feasible.
Therefore, from God's perspective, free will does not actually exist, [...]
If you mean the libertarian version of free will, that never existed under any circumstances. If you mean volition, that's a purely deterministic process. If you don't mean either of those, I don't know what you're referring to.
its a tough question. even if the world is determinstic, it doesnt mean creation is what happened. lets say both are true though...
free will does not exist (in the simple form). even if god doesnt exist, determinism doesnt allow free will because everything you "decide" you decided because of something else.
but some would say free will is simply the ability to act according to your nature without anything to prevent you from doing it. in this case, free will does exist in a way because we are acting according to our nature.
Are we accountable for decisions we were made to take? For us, of course we are. A bad act is bad whether the decision was inevitable or wanton, from our perspective. Determinism is not an excuse.
For an omniscient deity, things would be different. That deity would know we are ultimately helpless. Things would be even worse if the deity actually had an influence, however small, on the chain of events; in that case judging anyone for their acts would be hypocritical.
The notion of free will only works if some part of us is completely independent from the physical world (what most would identify as a 'soul'), however that would go against the notion of determinism. On the other hand, no soul means no afterlife and hence no judgement, which means the question has no real relevance except as a philosophical mind game.
but some would say free will is simply the ability to act according to your nature without anything to prevent you from doing it. in this case, free will does exist in a way because we are acting according to our nature.
That definition sounds a bit redundant to me. As you said, "determinism doesn't allow free will because everything you 'decide' you decide because of something else". This 'something else' is nothing else than 'your nature'. Where is the difference?
Hallos! Super busy over here, but this is such a great question that I can't help myself. Let's just make sure that's we're all on the same page here, though.
phil's question isn't so much about whether or not determinism is true, but whether its truth would undermine God's authority. So we have to grant as true a few things: 1) the truth of determinism, and 2) the existence of God. Otherwise the dialectic doesn't really go anywhere.
As an aside, this is a pretty interesting debate within the philosophy of religion, though it's typically posed as an epistemological question rather than a metaphysical one. The thought is this: God knows everything. This would include things that we are going to do. This would imply that we have no choice in the matter.
This leaves us with a dilemma:
1) Deny God's omniscience (at least to a degree).
2) Deny our free will.
Taking (1) would threaten the nature of God, so it's not a great option.
Taking (2) threatens our intuitions and motivates the point of this thread. If we have no choice in what we do, how can a just God punish us for our actions?
But now we need to get a bit clearer on what exactly the worry is. Let's say that you do X, which is a sin. As a result of X, you go to Hell. Now, there's no denying that you did X - and that's all that's required, really.
So we can take this argument in 1 of 2 directions. Either as an argument against God (or, at least, against some aspect of the nature of God). Or, we can run the line that we're not morally responsible for our actions. This would carry the implication that God can't punish us for actions that we carry no responsibility for. Of course, we can respond that God can do whatever He likes! But this puts pressure on His benevolent nature.
tl;dr - Should we think about responses that try to preserve our moral responsibility, or should we think about responses that try to preserve our understanding of God's nature?
I have had discussions relating to this with my religious friends; the answer for them tends to lean towards complex mental gymnastics where they try to defend both positions; That there is an omnipotent God and we have free will. Lately, the latter argument seems to be the flavour, that God is not all powerful. But that would make no sense when held to scrutiny.
Should we think about responses that try to preserve our moral responsibility, or should we think about responses that try to preserve our understanding of God's nature?
I see no point in preserving either. The major premise ensures the impossibility of moral responsibility, which ensures the impossibility of God being as traditionally understood (benevolent, omnipotent, omniscient, just).
I have had discussions relating to this with my religious friends; the answer for them tends to lean towards complex mental gymnastics where they try to defend both positions; That there is an omnipotent God and we have free will.
Was it something to do with people having a divine decision-making faculty specially made for them for the sole purpose of being causally independent, and therefore unpredictable even to their creator? That was the response I got last time.
Lately, the latter argument seems to be the flavour, that God is not all powerful. But that would make no sense when held to scrutiny.
How is that less sensical than a being that can do absolutely anything on a whim?
