Maybe. Put long opening posts to tend to discourage people who don't have much to say on the topic.
I don't think Firefly was hoping for large numbers of comments, but just substantial and intelligent ones.
Indeed. I would like to clarify, that I did not create this thread with the intention of alienating people from the discussion, rather to provoke some. A long OP, whilst it may discourage some users, is also often necessary to present a structured argument.
No talk of God or souls that doesn't relate directly to a specific argument.
Agreed, although I'd just like to say, before I begin, that I shall refer to the non physical aspect of dualism as a 'soul' purely for the sake of ease.
First, there are two kinds of dualism - substance dualism and property dualism. Interestingly, neither of them entail interaction between the substances. Some even posit a type of pre-established harmony between mind and body.
Firstly, I do not believe I implied that there was interaction between the body and soul, just that a connection exists, such as a pre-established connection. It is with this assumption that I take issue with. Interaction or no interaction, however, the logical flaws with regards to a connection itself still stand.
One move I really like is a clarification of what we mean by non-physical. It's conceivable that something might not take up physical space, but still reside in a physical location. The mind, while not spacial, clearly does exist somewhere in the brain.
I think it's important to clarify what is meant by the term 'mind'. Some cognitive psychologists would argue, (and on this count I agree), that the 'mind' is nothing more than a '
central executive'. Of course there are hundreds of psychological theories on what the 'mind' is. However, for the purpose of this argument, I think it is important to point out that, when philosophers refer to the mind as a sort of soul, that there is no evidence for this, and that there is more evidence in existence, which indicates that the mind is merely the activity of different parts of the physical brain. For example, in various studies, different areas of the brain light up when participants were performing different tasks, however the segments lighting up often did not correspond to that of other participants. In short, we do not know what the 'mind' is, and it is just as likely there is a perfectly reasonable biological explanation for it, than to assume it is your 'soul'.
You also made a point about some entity that is in the middle of physical and non-physical. I've never heard of such a theory. Something is either physical or it's not. Unless you want to adopt a logical system that doesn't include the Law of Excluded Middle, I think we should ignore these types of entities.
To the contrary, I am using this very flaw to point out the flaw in dualism itself. My point about a 'third state of being', demontrates that because the body and soul exist in different states, the connection between them has to be one that exists in a state that transcends the two. This is of course, in itself unsound, as you pointed out. I was not advocating the existence of such a state, rather exploring how dualism would have to work, the result being, it wouldn't.
A final note, please no one rail on me for these arguments. They're not mine, just standard sort of problems in the Philosophy of Mind. I don't wish to agree with or refute any of them at this point, merely try give some fuel to what looks like an excellent conversation.
I will attempt to argue from an anti-dualistic point of view, the arguments you presented, note I am not railing you personally, I am attempting to break them down some more.
The Conceivability Argument:
1) If I can clearly and distinctly conceive of x as separate from y, then x is a separate entity from y.
2) I can clearly and distinctly conceive of my mind as distinct from my body.
/ Therefore, my mind is a separate entity from my body.
That's assuming that the mind is indeed a separate entity from the body, not just part of our biology, a point I addressed earlier in this post.
How is it that we know our minds better than anything else?
Can I ask you to clarify what relevance this has to the argument for dualism itself?
How can our thoughts be "about" things - even things that don't exist?
Embarrassingly, I cannot remember which philosopher said this (I'm fairly certain he was Greek), or indeed the exact quote, but I'll just explain it instead for the purpose of this argument. Essentially he claimed that the imagination we humans seem to laud so, is not really that special. It seems that the human mind is very much like copy and paste. Instead of creating totally new ideas or images, we just take different things from different locations and stick them together to create something seemingly new.
An example of this would be to attempt to think of a completely new type of animal or life form. The result would ultimately be one that resembles, in some form, something you already have seen before.
Thus we humans do not really conceive things that don't exist, we just take existing things and stick them together.
We can doubt the content of our beliefs (I can doubt that I'm sitting here typing) but we can't doubt the "aboutness" of a belief (that my belief is about me typing).
I see what you are saying, but I fail to see why that belittles monoism.
Why do we have privileged access to our minds but not anyone else's?
If all there is are physical structures and interactions within systems, why can't I directly influence someone else's mind?
If we assume my biological take on the 'mind', to the first question, simply because we do not, at present understand where the mind resides exactly in the brain, or which cortex controls it. Thus, until we know more of the mind itself and how it operates, it would be impossible to do so.
To the second question, surely we can influence someone's mind through the power of persuasion and subliminal messaging? Various studies have shown that visual and audio prompts of the right nature within a controlled environment can indeed directly influence behaviour.
So, with (some of) the strengths of dualism a little more apparent, what can we say about the theory?
Personally, I would still accept dualism over monoism as a theory. Really, it's the use of Occam's Razor to believe in the possibility that makes fewest assumptions, which is in my opinion, monoism.