Alright, after a long time off of this wonderful sight, I decided to come back on and pose a question from a different debate I'm participating in.
I would like to ask: Is/Are there any studies, experiments or otherwise known physical laws, mathematical formulas or the like which explicitly prohibit and exclude the existence of a god (which one is not important for this question) or explicitly prohibit all things in existence being the result of a god?
this is the quote from one of the theists on the thread. so the question is: does any formula or theory disprove/prove a god in any way?
There might be something relevant to this discussion I read a long while ago. Luckily I was able to find out what it was again: it is about Julian Jayne's Bicameral Mind Theory. Sounds rather extravagant, and I have no idea what the current consensus (if there is one) on this is. Moe, maybe you can help me there?
I only know about the philosophical take on bicameralism, which does in fact have some pretty strong proponents. The philosophical notion is just that language is necessary for thought. Or better put, language is necessary for the kind of consciousness we all seem to have. But this is very distinct from Jayne's thought about the evolution of our current consciousness. I'm guessing what you're after, though, is the psychological conception, with which I'm not very familiar. If our distant descendants did, in fact, hear voices when trying to work out what to do in a particular situation, this would explain the prevalence of early 'religions' (I use the scare quotes because it's difficult to define early belief systems as religions). It's some pretty interesting stuff, but I'm wondering what conclusions we draw that are relevant to the discussion. Assuming that Jayne is right, the theory would have a great deal of explanatory power. It would undermine arguments that use early deistic beliefs to prove a god's existence. But it wouldn't go very far (if anywhere at all) to disprove a god's existence. Of course, if we can manage to counter all of the positive arguments on offer, it would intuitively strengthen the no-gods side of things.
I thought it might also be interesting especially concerning the debate about the rise of civilisations, and the argument that only "god-given morals" could have unified the people. What if the inputs that led to the formation of such bigger groups were indeed 'erceived' as god-given, explainedby this bicameralism?
Not that I actually believe god-given morals, genuine or hallucinatory, are the reason for civilisations. Other more obvious reasons have been mentioned, like shelter, the influence on trade, etc. I just think this bicameralism could explain certain things, details. And I will have to think of your point more thoroughly, Moe, but if you would like to explain how a non-religious cilivisation origin speaks in favour of a deity, be my guest
but if you would like to explain how a non-religious cilivisation origin speaks in favour of a deity, be my guest
Sorry, I guess that point was unclear. I completely agree with everything you're saying. The bicameralism argument, as I'll call it, would definitely undermine the notion of god-given morals in the rise of civilisations. I don't, however, think it's strong enough to get the conclusion that god-given morality arguments are false. It only demotivates them, which is almost as good. My point was that, given the question in the topic, I don't think the bicameralism argument can get us to the conclusion that god doesn't exist. In other words, it doesn't provide a positive account for 'our side'. To be fair, demotivating the opponents' arguments is a step in this direction. But it would be stronger if there was a strict dichotomy in the background. If it was something like 'this particular god exists' vs. 'this particular god doesn't exist, then demotivating the opposite side would motivate the other. But when we're talking about early civilisation, we're not talking talking about any sort of 'contemporary' deity. In short, demotivating arguments for early deities still leaves open lots and lots of other gods that we need to engage with. This brings me back to my earlier point, however. All this discussion of early civilisation doesn't offer a straightforward argument for a god (as least, as it's presented).
If religion isn't needed for any practical reason, this might speak in favour of some sort of deity. In other words, it would speak less to the notion of religion being invented, where the notion of an invention implies some goal (e.g. resolving a particular problem, making something easier to do, etc.). Instead, it would seem that religion is some sort of unavoidable consequence of the human experience.
Humans generally have a need to explain their observations. This need is the driving force of science and the origin of mythology.
In forming a mythology, ancient people made inferences about the world. As they had no understanding of cosmology, molecular physics, biogenesis, disease propagation, meteorology, or neuroscience, and possessing only rudimentary knowledge of classical physics, these people were forced to attribute their observations to magic, spiritualism, and mysticism.
Because the concept of infinity is difficult to imagine, it is common for a mythology to include some form of creation story. To bring about such a creation and skirt around the problem of what was before it, one or more entities of supreme preterlogical power are invented. This kind of mythology begets the worship of such entities, and thus religion. Therefore, religion is an early product of the human search for understanding, which serves its purpose until true understanding is attained.
The philosophical notion is just that language is necessary for thought. Or better put, language is necessary for the kind of consciousness we all seem to have.
This is illogical, as the development of a complex language system would require conscious thought processes to be present.
If our distant descendants did, in fact, hear voices when trying to work out what to do in a particular situation, this would explain the prevalence of early 'religions' (I use the scare quotes because it's difficult to define early belief systems as religions).
Jaynes's proposal is also untenable. We have no reason to assume that the "auditory hallucinations" he describes are any different from the "verbal" thoughts we experience today, some of which are still seen as originating outside the mind (epiphany).
Jaynes's proposal is also untenable. We have no reason to assume that the "auditory hallucinations" he describes are any different from the "verbal" thoughts we experience today, some of which are still seen as originating outside the mind (epiphany).
Jayne's claim, though, is not that those two are different thoughts; but that we are now consciously aware about those thoughts, and that the ancient people were not. A sort of schizophrenia if you will. I think if you have a close look at his arguments, it gets a bit clearer. And I'm not claiming to really believe him, but it's certainly worth our attention, as neurologically speaking there seems to be some evidence at least for such a possibility.
This is illogical, as the development of a complex language system would require conscious thought processes to be present.
The thought here is that there was some level of consciousness on offer - just not the 'what it's like' kind of consciousness we have today. This may seem untenable, but I'd like to bring up prairie dogs. To be clear - I have absolutely no expertise whatsoever in this area. But I've seen nature docs that have convinced me that prairie dogs have a fairly complex language. And their consciousness is likely nothing like ours. They can even make up new 'words' for objects they haven't seen before. There are other examples of pretty complex languages in whales. I'm not saying this is a knock-down defence of philosophical bicameralism. But we should be careful to not make the mistake viewing our current state as one of irreducible complexity.
Instead, it would seem that religion is some sort of unavoidable consequence of the human experience. This might suggest the presence of a deity to which we lack proper epistemic access. Thus early religions are simply an attempt to gain that access and understand the nature of this deity.
This statement reminded me of this video. Basically the region is a byproduct that coops various functions of our mind that are used and useful for other things.
If our distant descendants did, in fact, hear voices when trying to work out what to do in a particular situation, this would explain the prevalence of early 'religions' (I use the scare quotes because it's difficult to define early belief systems as religions).
Did you know that it's quite common for children to experience hallucinations, particularly audio hallucination. This often remains common up to the age of 16. If I remember correctly it's the result of the brain continuing to form and develop during this stage of life.
Jayne's claim, though, is not that those two are different thoughts; but that we are now consciously aware about those thoughts, and that the ancient people were not.
This would mean only that people were prone, through lack of understanding, to misinterpret their own thought processes. It doesn't suggest any relation to schizophrenia, as there is no mental disconnect, nor is this misinterpretation specific to ancient people.
I'm not saying this is a knock-down defence of philosophical bicameralism. But we should be careful to not make the mistake viewing our current state as one of irreducible complexity
Not at all. If you recall, I am not a proponent of the so-called superiority of human intellect, so language systems in other species do not invalidate my statement. If language is prerequisite to consciousness or cognition, this would require that the following are true: 1. All creatures with the latter must have the former, even if they can't communicate that language. This is highly dubious, but not unthinkable. 2. Such creatures must be capable of developing a functional language from scratch unconsciously and/or without thinking. This, as I see it, is illogical.
Ohhh that's right. I didn't put that together. So we've just been working from different frameworks. It does seem that bicameralism would be inconsistent with your views about intellect (assuming intellect covaries with consciousness). Well, poo. I think we'll just have to agree to disagree on this point! Either way, it's not a very strong argument for the topic of the thread anyway.
