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Ntech
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Ntech
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@Hahiha @Doombreed
Of our Knowledge of the Existence of a God
(John Locke, Concerning Human Understanding: Chapter X, pages 349 – 351)
(Articles I – VI, VIII)

I. We are capable of knowing certainly that there is a God. Though God has given us no innate ideas of Himself,; though He has stamped no original characters on our minds, wherein we may read His being; yet having furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed with, He hath not left Himself without witness: since we have sense, perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear proof of Him, as long as we carry ourselves about us...

II. For man knows that he himself exists. I think it is beyond question, that man has a clear idea of his own being; he knows certainly that he exists, and that he is something. He that can doubt whether he be anything or no, I speak not to; no more than I would argue with pure nothing, or endeavor to convince a nonentity that it were something. If any one pretends to be so skeptical as to deny his own existence, (for really to doubt of it is manifestly impossible,) let him for me enjoy his beloved happiness of being nothing, until hunger or some other pain convince him of the contrary. This, then, I think I may take for a truth, which every one’s certain knowledge assures him of, beyond the liberty of doubting, viz. That he is something that actually exists. [Note well the meaning of “actually,” that is, something that is actual vs. that which does not exist.]

III. He knows also that nothing cannot produce a being; therefore something must have existed from eternity. In the next place, man knows, by an intuitive certainty, that bare nothing can no more produce any real being, than it can be equal to two right angles. If a man knows not that nonentity, or the absence of all being, cannot be equal to two right angles, it is impossible he should know any demonstration in Euclid. If, therefore, we know there is some real being, and that nonentity cannot produce any real being, it is an evident demonstration, that from eternity there has been something; since what was not from eternity had a beginning; and what had a beginning must be produced by something else.

IV. And that eternal Being must be most powerful. Next, it is evident, that what had its being and beginning from another, must also have all that which is in and belongs to its being from another too. All the powers it has must be owing to and received from the same source. This eternal source, then, of all being must also be the source and origin of all power; and so this eternal Being must also be the most powerful.

V. And most knowing. Again, a man finds in himself perception and knowledge. We have then got one step further; and we are certain now that there is not only some being, but some knowing, intelligent being in the world. There was a time, then, where was no knowing being and when knowledge began to be; or else there has been also a knowing being from eternity.

If it be said, there was a time when no being had any knowledge, when that eternal being was void of understanding; I reply, that then it was impossible there should ever have been any knowledge: it being as impossible that things wholly void of knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any perception, should produce a knowing being, as it is impossible that a triangle should make itself three angles bigger than two right ones. For it is as repugnant to the idea of senseless matter, that it should put into itself sense, perception, and knowledge, as it is repugnant to the idea of a triangle, that it should put into itself greater angles than two right ones.

VI. And therefore God. Thus, from the consideration of ourselves, and what we infallibly find in our own constitutions, our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth, – That there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being; which whether any one will please to call God, it matters not. The thing is evident; and from this idea duly considered, will easily be deduced all those other attributes, which we ought to ascribe to this eternal Being.

If, nevertheless, any one should be found so senselessly arrogant, as to suppose man alone knowing and wise, but yet the product of mere ignorance and chance; and that all the rest of the universe acted only by that blind haphazard; I shall leave him that very rational and emphatical rebuke of Tully (1. ii. De Leg.), to be considered at his leisure: “What can be more sillily arrogant and mis-becoming, than for a man to think that he has a mind and understanding in him, but yet in all the universe beside there is no such thing? Or that those things, which with the utmost stretch of his reason he can scarce comprehend, should be moved and managed without any reason at all?” Quid est enim verius, quam neminem esse oportere tam stulte arrogantem, ut in se mentem et rationem putet inesse, in caelo mundoque non putet? Aut ea quae vic summa ingenii [ingenī] ratione comprehendat, nulla ratione moveri puter?

From what has been said, it is plain to me we have a more certain knowledge of the existence of a God, than of anything our senses have not immediately discovered to us. Nay, I presume I may say, that we more certainly know that there is a God, than that there is anything else without us. When I say we know, I mean there is such a knowledge within our reach which we cannot miss, if we will but apply our minds to that…

VIII. Recapitulation – something from eternity. There is no truth more evident than that something must be from eternity. I never yet heard of any one so unreasonable, or that could suppose so manifest a contradiction, as a time wherein there was perfectly nothing. This being of all absurdities the greatest, to imagine that pure nothing, the perfect negation and absence of all beings [Id est, the complete absence of actualities], should ever produce any real existence. [Id est, actualities have potential, where there is no actualities there is no potential, nor can there ever be.]

Of God – His Existence
(Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, Part I)

DEFINITIONS

1. BY CAUSE of itself, I understand that, [a Being] whose essence involves existence; or that, [a Being] whose nature cannot be conceived unless existing.

2. That thing is called FINITE in its own kind (in suo genere) which can be limited by another thing of the same nature. For example, a body is called finite, because we [may] always conceive another which is greater. So a thought is limited by another thought; but a body is not limited by a thought, not a thought by a body.

3. BY SUBSTANCE, I understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; in other words, that, the conception of which does not need the conception of another thing from which it must be formed.

4. BY ATTRIBUTE, I understand that which the intellect perceives of substance, as if constituting its essence [constituting the essence of a substance, not the intellect].

5. BY MODE, I understand the affections of substance, or that which is in another thing through which also it is conceived.

6. BY GOD, I understand Being absolutely infinite, that is to say, [a] substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence.

Explanation. I say absolutely infinite but not infinite in its own kind (in suo genere); for of whatever is infinite only in its own kind (in suo genere), we can deny infinite attributes; but to the essence of that which is absolutely infinite pertains whatever expresses essence and involves no negation.

7. That thing is called FREE which exists from the necessity of its own nature alone, and is determined to action by itself alone. That thing, on the other hand, is called necessary, or rather compelled, which by another is determined to existence and action in a fixed and prescribed manner.

8. BY ETERNITY, I understand existence itself, so far as it is conceived necessarily to follow from the definition alone of the eternal thing.

Explanation. For such existence, like the essence of the thing, is conceived as an eternal truth. It cannot therefore be explained by duration or time, even if the duration be conceived without beginning or end.

AXIOMS

1. Everything which is, is either in itself or in another.

2. That which cannot be conceived through another must be conceived through itself.

3. From a given determinate cause an effect necessarily follows; and, on the other hand, if no determinate cause be given, it is impossible that an effect can follow.

4. The knowledge (cognitio) of an effect depends upon and involves the knowledge of the cause.

5. Those things which have nothing mutually in common with one another cannot through one another be mutually understood, that is to say, the conception of the other. [A blind man cannot understand the sense of sight merely through the sense of hearing; nor can a deaf man understand the sense of hearing merely through the sense of sight.]

6. A true idea must agree with that of which it is the idea (*** suo ideato).

7. The essence of that thing which can be conceived as not existing does not involve existence.

PROPOSITIONS

PROPOSITION 1. Substance is by its nature prior to its affections.
DEMONSTRATION. This is evident from Definitions 3 and 5. [That is to say, nothing can have no affections.]

PROPOSITION 2. Two substances having different attributes have nothing in common with one another.
DEMONSTRATION. This is also evident from Definition 3. For each substance must be in itself and must be conceived through itself, that is to say, the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other. [That is to say, if two substances – which are wholly independent of each other – have different attributes, it is self evident that they share nothing in common – the opposite of proper – with each other.] Q.E.D.

PROPOSITION 3. If two things have nothing in common with one another, one cannot be the cause of the other.
DEMONSTRATION. If they have nothing mutually common with one another, they cannot (Axiom 5) through one another be mutually understood, and therefore (Axiom 4) one cannot be the cause of the other. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITION 4.Two or more distinct things are distinguished from one another, either by the difference of the attributes of the substances, or by the difference of their affections.
DEMONSTRATION. Everything which is, is either in itself or in another (Axiom 1), that is to say (Definitions 3 & 5), outside the intellect there is nothing but substances and their affections. There is nothing therefore outside the intellect by which a number of things can be distinguished one from another, but substances or (which is the same thing by Definition 4) their attributes and their affections. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITION 5. In nature there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute.
DEMONSTRATION. If there were two or more distinct substances, they must be distinguished one from the other by difference of attributes or difference of affections (Proposition 4). If they are distinguished only by difference of attributes, it will be granted that there is but one substance of the same attribute. But if they are distinguished by difference of affections, since substance is prior by nature to its affections (Proposition 1), the affections therefore being placed on one side, and the substance being considered in itself, or, in other words, (Definition 3 and Axiom 6), truly considered, it cannot be conceived as distinguished from another substance, that is to say (Proposition 4), there cannot be two or more substances, but only one possessing the same nature or attribute. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITION 6.One substance cannot be produced by another substance.
DEMONSTRATION. There cannot in nature be two substances of the same attribute (Proposition 5), that is to say (Proposition 2), two which have anything in common with one another. And therefore (Proposition 3) one [substance] cannot be the cause of the other, that is to say, one [substance] cannot be produced by the other [substance]. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITION 7. It pertains to the nature of substance to exist.
DEMONSTRATION. There is nothing by which substance can be produced (Proposition 6). It will therefore be the cause of itself, that is to say (Definition 1), its essence necessarily involves existence, or in other words it pertains to its nature to exist. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITION 8. Every substance is necessarily infinite.
DEMONSTRATION. Substance which has only one attribute cannot exist except as one substance (Proposition 6), and to the nature of this one substance it pertains to exist (Proposition 7). It must therefore from its nature exist as finite or infinite. But it cannot exist as finite substance, for (Definition 2) it must (if finite) be limited by another substance of the same nature, which also must necessarily exist (Proposition 7), and therefore would be two substances of the same attribute, which is absurd (Proposition 5). It exists therefore as infinite substance. Q.E.D.

Scholium 1. Since finiteness is in truth partly negation, and infinitude absolute affirmation of existence of some kind, it follows from Proposition 7 alone that all substance must be infinite.

Scholium 2. I fully expect that those who judge things confusedly, and who have not been accustomed to cognise things through their first causes, will find it difficult to comprehend the demonstration of the 7th Proposition, since they do not distinguish between the modifications of substances and substances themselves, and are ignorant of the manner in which things are produced.
Hence it comes to pass that they erroneously ascribe to substances a beginning like that which they see belongs to natural things; for those who are ignorant of the true causes of things confound every thing, and without any mental repugnance represent trees speaking like men, or imagine that men are made out of stones as well as begotten from seed, and that all forms can be changed one into the other. So also those who confound human nature with the divine, readily attribute to God human affects, especially so long as they are ignorant of the manner in which affects are produced in the mind. But if men would attend to the nature of substance, they could not entertain a single doubt of the truth of Proposition 7; indeed this proposition would be considered by all to be axiomatic, and reckoned among common notions.
For by “substance” would be understood that which is in itself and is conceived through itself, or, in other words, that, the knowledge of which does not need the knowledge of another thing.
But by “modifications” would be understood those things which are in another thing – those things, the conception of which is formed from the conception of the thing in which they are. Hence we can have true ideas of non-existent modifications, since although they may not actually exist outside the intellect, their essence nevertheless is so comprehended in something else, that they may be conceived through it.
But the truth of substances is not outside the intellect unless in the substances themselves, because they are conceived through themselves.
If any one, therefore, were to say that he possessed a clear and distinct, that is to say, a true idea of substance, and that he nevertheless doubted whether such a substance exists, he would forsooth be in the same position as if he were to say that he had a true idea and nevertheless doubted whether or not it was false (as is evident to any one who pays a little attention).
Similarly, if any one were to affirm that substance is created, he would affirm at the same time that a false idea had become true, and this is a greater absurdity than can be conceived.
It is therefore necessary to admit that, the existence of substance, like its essence, is an eternal truth.
Hence a demonstration (which I have thought worth while to append) by a different method is possible, showing that there are not to substances possessing the same nature.
But in order to prove this methodically it is to be noted: 1. That the true definition of any one thing neither involves nor expresses anything except the nature of the thing defined. From which it follows, 2. That a definition does not involve or express any certain number of individuals, since it expresses nothing but the nature of the thing defined. For example, the definition of a triangle expresses nothing but the simple nature of a triangle, and not any certain number of triangles. 3. It is to be observed that of every existing thing there is some certain cause by reason of which it exists. 4. Finally, it is to be observed that this cause, by reason of which a thing exists, must either be contained in the nature itself and definition of the existing thing (simply because it pertains to the nature of the thing to exist), or it must exist outside the thing.
This being granted, it follows that if a certain number of individuals exist in nature, there must necessarily be a cause why those individuals, and neither more nor fewer, exist.
If, for example, there are twenty men in existence (whom, for the sake of greater clearness, I suppose existing at the same time, and that no others existed before them), it will not be sufficient, in order that we may give a reason why twenty men exist, to give a cause for human nature generally; but it will be necessary, in addition, to give a reason why neither more nor fewer than twenty exist, since, as we have already observed, under the third head, there must necessarily be a cause why each exists.
But this cause (as we have shown under the second and third heads) cannot be contained in human nature itself, since the true definition of a man does not involve the number twenty, and therefore (by the fourth head) the cause why these twenty men exist, and consequently the cause of why each exists, must necessarily lie outside each one; and therefore we must conclude generally that whenever it is possible for several individuals of the same nature to exist, there must necessarily be an external cause for their existence.
Since now it pertains to the nature of substance to exist (as we have shown in this Scholium), its definition must involve necessary existence, and consequently from its definition alone its existence must be concluded.
But from its definition (as we have already shown under the second and third heads) the existence of more substances than one cannot be deduced.
It follows, therefore, from this definition necessarily that there cannot be two substances possessing the same nature.

PROPOSITION 9. The more reality or being a thing possesses, the more attributes belong to it.
DEMONSTRATION. This is evident from Definition 4. [For as attributes constitute a thing’s essence to the intellect, the more “essence” a thing has, a corresponding number of attributes is perceived by the intellect.]

PROPOSITION 10. Each attribute of a substance must be conceived through itself.
DEMONSTRATION. For an attribute is that which the intellect perceives of substance, as if constituting its essence (Definition 4), and therefore (Definition 3) it must be conceived through itself. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITION 11. God, or substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists.
DEMONSTRATION. If this be denied, conceive, if it is possible that God does not exist. Then it follows (Axiom 7) that His essence does not involve existence. But this (Proposition 7) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists. Q.E.D.

Another proof. For the existence or non-existence of everything there must be a reason or cause. For example, if a triangle exists, there must be a reason or cause why it exists; and if it does not exist, there must be a reason or cause which hinders its existence or which negates it.
But this reason or cause must either be contained in the nature of the thing or lie outside it. For example, the nature of the thing itself shows the reason why a square circle does not exist, the reason being that a square circle involves a contradiction. And the reason, on the other hand, why substance involves existence (see Proposition 7).
But the reason why a circle or triangle exists or does not exist is not drawn from their nature, but from the order of corporeal nature generally; for from that it must follow, either that a triangle necessarily exists, or that is impossible for it to exist. But this is self evident.
Therefore it follows that if there be no cause nor reason which hinders a thing from existing, it exists necessarily. If, therefore, there be no reason nor cause which hinders God from existence, or which negates His existence, we must conclude absolutely that He exists.
But if there be such a reason or cause, it must be either be in the nature itself of God or must lie outside it, that is to say, in another substance of another nature. For if the reason lay in a substance of the same nature, the existence of God would by this very fact admitted.
But substance possessing another nature could have nothing in common with God (Proposition 2), and therefore could not give Him existence nor negate it.
Since, therefore, the reason or cause which could negate the divine existence cannot be outside the divine nature, it will necessarily, supposing that the divine nature does not exist, be in His Nature itself, which would therefore involve a contradiction.
But to affirm this of the Being absolutely infinite and consummately perfect is absurd. Therefore neither in God nor outside God is there any cause or reason which can negate His existence, and therefore God necessarily exists. Q.E.D.

Another proof. Inability to exist is impotence, and, on the other hand, ability to exist is power, as is self-evident. If, therefore, there is nothing which necessarily exists excepting things finite, it follows that things finite are more powerful than the absolutely infinite Being, and this (as is self evident) is absurd; therefore either nothing exists or Being absolutely infinite also necessarily exists.
But we ourselves exist, either in ourselves or in something else which necessarily exists (Axiom 1 & Proposition 7). Therefore the Being absolutely infinite, that is to say (Definition 6), God, necessarily exists. Q.E.D.

Scholium. In this last demonstration I wished to prove the existence of God a posteriori, in order that the demonstration be the more easily understood, and not because the existence of God does not follow a priori from the same grounds.
For since ability to exist is power, it follows that the more reality belongs to the nature of anything, the greater is the power for existence it derives from itself; and it also follows, therefore, that the Being absolutely infinite, or God, has from Himself an absolutely infinite power of existence, and that He therefore necessarily exists.
Many persons, nevertheless, will perhaps not be able easily to see the force of this demonstration, because they have been accustomed to contemplate those things alone which flow from external causes, and they see also that those things which are quickly produced from these causes, that is to say, which easily exist, easily perish, whilst, on the other hand, they adjudge those things to be more difficult to produce, that is to say, not so easy to bring into existence, to which they conceive more properties pertain.
In order that these prejudices may be removed, I do not need here to show in what respect this saying, “What is quickly made perishes,” is true, nor to inquire whether, looking at the whole of nature, all things are or are not equally easy.
But this only it will be sufficient for me to observe, that I do not speak of things which are produced by external causes, but that I speak of substances alone which (Proposition 6) can be produced by no external cause.
For whatever perfection or reality those things may have which are produced by external causes, whether they consist of many parts or of few, they owe it all to the virtue of an external cause alone and not from their own.
On the other hand, whatever perfection substance has is due to no external cause.
Therefore its existence must follow from its nature alone, and is therefore nothing else than its essence.
Perfection consequently does not prevent the existence of a thing, but establishes it; imperfection, on the other hand, prevents existence, and so of no existence can we be more sure than of the existence of the Being absolutely infinite or perfect, that is to say, God.
For since His essence shuts out all imperfection and involves absolute perfection, for this very reason all cause of doubt concerning His existence is taken away, and the highest certainty concerning it is given, – a truth which I trust will be evident to any one who bestows only moderate attention.

  • 180 Replies
HahiHa
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HahiHa
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Regent

but i mean like where would we have gotten the ideas of ghosts and unearthly beings?

Animism and similar beliefs which predated organized religions such as Christianity. Such beliefs usually result from peculiar physical and psychological phenomena, see for example pareidolia. Over time they evolved to include new concepts like afterlife and heaven etc.

and why do we love good guys against bad guys, heres?

Because we're social animals and "bad guys" are harmful to society and ultimately ourselves. Religious morals step from social morals, not the other way.
FishPreferred
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FishPreferred
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Duke

but i mean like where would we have gotten the ideas of ghosts and unearthly beings?
From some combination of the Forer effect, ideomotor response, apophenia, faulty generalization, neurological disorder, memory bias, lighting tricks, hallucinogens, pranks, unbalanced torque, heat conduction, overcredulity, and/or wishful thinking. That should cover just about everything.

[...] but what if the most debated and important hero of all, God. exists?
Then His PR team has a lot of explaining to do.
Doombreed
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Doombreed
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That should cover just about everything

Doesn't cover mental illness Like schizophrenia

lozerfac3
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lozerfac3
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Farmer

I want to join the conversation too! But I'm not sure how to contribute... I just know that I tend to agree with HahiHa and FishPreferred about ghosts. It's interesting to learn about the history of animism too. I also don't find much hope with Ntech's arguments.

HahiHa
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HahiHa
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Regent

What's the official position of the church concerning things like ghosts, anyway? I suspect that even if they did exist, which they don't, they wouldn't be evidence for the Christian god. After all, in Christian beliefs souls are supposed to be judged and sent to heaven or hell; I don't remember anything mentioning second chances, and souls getting 'lost' would be a testament of imperfection for the whole system. Also the church officially abandoned the concept of a limbo a while ago, so it couldn't be that either.

lozerfac3
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lozerfac3
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Farmer

I'm not exactly sure the official beliefs of my church, but he way I heard explained before was that there are no such things as ghosts, but evil spirits do exist in our world. My aunt told me some "ghost" stories, where the spirits would try to scare her or something while she was sharing the gospel to someone. Apparently she was a target because my uncle (her husband) used to be an exorcist. They wanted to start a family so they stopped because they didn't want my cousins to deal with that or something, and now my uncle is just a pastor. I think the main distinction between ghosts and evil spirits, is that ghosts are spirits from people who used to live on earth, and evils spirits are ones employed by the devil in order to discourage believers or spread lies. For example, my dad told me that it was probably an evil spirit that visited Joseph Smith and not an angel.

EPICRAIDER1990
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EPICRAIDER1990
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Nomad

hahiha Im just saying, where did we get all those ideas though? i mean,it has to come from somewhere

HahiHa
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HahiHa
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@EPICRAIDER1990 Yes, but everything points to a psychological/neurological cause, sometimes induced by physical phenomena. Some experiments have demonstrated that exposing subjects to situations with conflicting inputs/stimuli can make some people feel unwell or afraid, or even lead them to 'feel' a presence where in reality there is none. It is likely a result of our brain interpreting and trying to solve seemingly contradictory information by adding another agent (which, depending on the person, might be interpreted as supernatural). Other experiments showed that direct stimulation of certain brain areas (particularly in the frontal lobe) can result in similar 'perceived presences'. Even infrasound at frequencies just below human hearing range have been reported to provoke similar uncanny feelings, and in some cases may even explain "haunted" places.

There are many more phenomena like those that can explain ghost sightings. Of course there is not one ultimate explanation for every ghost story ever, there are rather a certain amount of possible causes depending on the situation and especially on the person, since not every person reacts in exactly the same way or scale to such phenomena. As has been mentioned before by FishPreferred and Doombreed, neurological disorders and mental illness can also be causes. Though remember, not everyone who experiences such situations is necessarily ill; it can and does happen to perfectly healthy people all the time. It's just how our brain works.

Ghost stories and beliefs like animism have more to do with culture, it is how certain populations have tried to explain those phenomena over time. Just like religion, they're part of how we have always been trying to make sense of our world, except that those beliefs have persisted in our various cultures and often resist the more recent findings and insight that conflict with it.

Ntech
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Ntech
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@FishPreferred


No; you're just conflating state with existence.

No, I am not. If an actuality necessarily exists as a result of its actualization, then it cannot exist in any other way, for that other way is not that thing, but a different thing altogether.


They're aggregates of things that already exist.

Then, I ask, what sustains that existence? What actualizes those things continually that they may continue in that existence?


If all you're trying to say is that we are capable of ceasing to exist, sure, but that's actual existence and not potential existence. If what you are trying to say is that while we exist we can simultaneously not exist, no, because that's just nonsense.

True, we actually exist the moment we are actualized, but take the next moment. We may and may not be actualized tomorrow, or even next second. Thus, our continued existence is potential, and for us to continue to exist requires us to be sustained in motion -- that is, sustained in actualization.


No, they aren't. That's like claiming that the planets would be stuck in place without invisible gremlins to push them across the sky. You can ask what is there to keep them moving, but I can as well ask what is there to stop them.

1. Things in motion (from potence to actuality) cannot cause themselves.
2. Therefore if a thing is in motion another necessarily put it in motion.
3. Moreover, a things continued existence is potential.
4. Therefore, if that thing continues to exist that potential of continued existence was actualized.
5. And it did not actualize itself.

And that goes for everything in existence. Therefore, the fact that we continue to exist demands the existence of a Sustaining Principle.


No, it is not impossible because of being impossible. Come up with an actual reason.

If you hold that it is impossible for me to say that, you're wrong.

What I mean is that we cannot say that the Big Bang created us, and that what we have today are those things that the big bang created in aggregations of their original form, FOR the big bang, were it true, only attempts to account for the actualization of those things back when the big bang occurred, and those things were actualized right now, certainly not by that big bang, but by the Sustaining Principle.


No. A thing in motion can't just suddenly not be in motion, because that would create a change out of nothing. As I said before, a "Sustaining Principle" would be entirely unnecessary and frivolous. You'd need to invent another thing (a "Negating Principle", if you will) just to give it a reason to exist.

Statement: a thing potentially not exists. Therefore: something actualizes its continued existence. For: a things continued existence requires its actualization -- the actualization of the possibility of its continued existence. Q.E.D.


No; but everybody basing their reasoning purely on Aristotle, Plato, and Augustine certainly did.

So who was the genius who invented the true form of logic that you profess to pursue?


Okay, for the sake of argument we can pretend for the moment that this is true. What was it I was claiming to have proven, again? . . .

You were claiming to have proven by your statements, that Western philosophy was based on unfounded assumptions, as well as that Aristotle, Plato, and Augustine were incorrect. Those claims are unsubstantiated by evidence, the lack of which suffices the term "lack of factual basis."

@Hahiha


we know that an object which is set in motion will continue to move in the same speed and direction unless an outside force acts on it.

That is apparently true, yet we are concerned with metaphysics, not physics. We are concerned about what made that object which is in physical "motion" in the motion from potence to actuality. While it may appear to "move" through the sensory we possess as material cogniscent creatures, we want to know how it exists, why it exists, and why it continues to move from potence to actuality.

The two "motions" are totally unrelated.

Boofuss
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@Ntech

I think at this point, what you need to do is look at the teachings and the knowledge that came after the things you keep repeating.

It's like assuming and fighting the corner that thunder is still created by giant birds flapping their wings even though the world's knowledge and understanding has moved on.

FishPreferred
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Duke

[...] for that other way is not that thing, but a different thing altogether.
No, it isn't. The ship of Theseus isn't replaced with another ship every time the captain washes his hair, for example; it just goes from having a captain with unwashed hair to having a captain with clean hair. That is, the state of its captain's hair changes, but the ship, the captain, and the hair are the same objects they were before.

Then, I ask, what sustains that existence? What actualizes those things continually that they may continue in that existence?
I answer, nothing whatsoever, because without other things acting upon them, their existence has no reason not to continue indefinitely.

We may and may not be actualized tomorrow, or even next second. Thus, our continued existence is potential, and for us to continue to exist requires us to be sustained in motion -- that is, sustained in actualization.
No, that's entirely false.

1. Things in motion (from potence to actuality) cannot cause themselves.
Okay.

2. Therefore if a thing is in motion another necessarily put it in motion.
No, but I can see where you get that idea.

3. Moreover, a things continued existence is potential.
No. If we've established that this thing has a continued existence, its existence is and will be actual.

4. Therefore, if that thing continues to exist that potential of continued existence was actualized.
No, the thing just wasn't destroyed by anything yet.

5. And it did not actualize itself.
Still okay.

And that goes for everything in existence. Therefore, the fact that we continue to exist demands the existence of a Sustaining Principle.
Nope, try again.

If you hold that it is impossible for me to say that, you're wrong.
If you're confused about what I said, you should have checked the link. Your claim is not a validation of itself.

[...] and those things were actualized right now, certainly not by that big bang, but by the Sustaining Principle.
Wrong again.

Statement: a thing potentially not exists. Therefore: something actualizes its continued existence. For: a things continued existence requires its actualization -- the actualization of the possibility of its continued existence. Q.E.D.
Vide Supra.

So who was the genius who invented the true form of logic that you profess to pursue?
Not being someone who relies on genetic fallacy, I don't particularly care.

You were claiming to have proven by your statements, that Western philosophy was based on unfounded assumptions, as well as that Aristotle, Plato, and Augustine were incorrect.
Aheh. No. Try focussing on the statements I've actually made, instead of whatever statements your argument would most easily benefit from.

While it may appear to "move" through the sensory we possess as material cogniscent creatures, we want to know how it exists, why it exists, and why it continues to move from potence to actuality.
Now we're getting somewhere. Unfortunately, you're still begging the question at the end. We don't need to search for the reasons behind something that has no basis in reality, so convincing us that this potence actualization is a real occurrence or process should be your main goal right now.

The two "motions" are totally unrelated.
Protip: Don't call things motion when they have nothing to do with motion.
Ntech
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Ntech
257 posts
Shepherd

@FishPreferred @Boofuss


No, it isn't. The ship of Theseus isn't replaced with another ship every time the captain washes his hair, for example; it just goes from having a captain with unwashed hair to having a captain with clean hair. That is, the state of its captain's hair changes, but the ship, the captain, and the hair are the same objects they were before.

Exactly. They are the same, and the possibility of their continued existence was potence only a second before he washed his hair, therefore something other than himself actualized him. The same for everything he sees after he washes his hair, they did not actualize the potence of their continued existence, yet they still exist, therefore, the Sustaining Principle exists.


I answer, nothing whatsoever, because without other things acting upon them, their existence has no reason not to continue indefinitely.

When you consider that their future existence is potential, and that a thing can not actualize itself, it is clear that if a thing continues in existence -- to be continuously actualized -- "indefinitely," then it is not because of itself but because of another.

Your observation about "reasons" to continue existing deal with motion as in the physical observable to us, as well as the observation that the Sustaining Principle sustains beings in their movement, and sometimes the movement of one thing causes the inexistence of another.

Yet we are not primarily concerned with physical movement, only insofar as its consideration helps us to understand causality in relation to existence. Thus before you say that things sustain in their movement, you must acknowledge that the things are in movement, thus acknowledging the Sustaining Principle, which sustains those things in their continuous movement from potence to actuality each and every moment.


No, that's entirely false.

So you are saying that you already exist tomorrow, and that your continued existence is not potential but actual?


No, but I can see where you get that idea.

Let me restate myself, in a more concise manner.

"2. Therefore, if a thing exists (the movement from the potence of its existence to its actual existence), that thing did not cause (move) itself therefore something else necessarily did for it to exist."


No. If we've established that this thing has a continued existence, its existence is and will be actual.

We have not established that you exist before you do; no, in fact, such a thing is illogical. Your continued existence, as is mine, is totally potential. While our continued existence is plausible, as no things sustained (by the Sustaining Principle in existence) in motion may seem to deny us continued motion, our continued existence springs not from ourselves, but from another, for our continued existence is potential. Therefore, the Sustaining Principle must exist.

While a thing's existence is "actual" the moment it is actualized, the next moment its existence is potential, no matter what you will.


No, the thing just wasn't destroyed by anything yet.

Therefore the Sustaining Principle will actualize it again. Observations about the tendencies of the Sustaining Principle do not refute it, nor do they negate the necessary need for its existence.


Nope, try again.

Everything in existence might exist the next moment, and they might not. For their continued existence is not actual as of yet. And as a thing does not cause itself (that is, a thing does not actualize the potential of its own existence), another must cause (actualize) it the next moment, else it would not exist, nor appear to continue in existence.


Vide Supra.

Te.


We don't need to search for the reasons behind something that has no basis in reality, so convincing us that this potence actualization is a real occurrence or process should be your main goal right now.

Proof:

1. A thing potentially exists the next moment. By existence is meant its actualization.
2. A thing cannot actualize itself.
3. Therefore a Sustaining Principle necessarily exists, which actualizes everything's potential of continued actuality into actuality.


Protip: Don't call things motion when they have nothing to do with motion.

The change from potence to actuality arguably can be called "movement." But for matters of clarification, I shall change my language for the purposes of my argument, subsequently calling
hereforth what I called "motion" "existence," "continued actualization," "sustained existence."
Boofuss
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Boofuss
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@Ntech you've tagged me in there, but my point about not just repeating the same stuff but applying the newer ideas and knowledge still stands.

HahiHa
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HahiHa
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@Ntech
The future does not exist, neither does potential existence. A thing either exists or doesn't. Time is merely the speed at which processes happen, not a dimension that objects 'move', or have to be 'moved', through.

Ntech
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Ntech
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Shepherd

@Hahiha


The future does not exist, neither does potential existence. A thing either exists or doesn't. Time is merely the speed at which processes happen, not a dimension that objects 'move', or have to be 'moved', through.

Correct. What does this have to do with our debate?

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