The "Great Theists vs. Atheists"-thread spawned this interesting tangent, which is worthy a topic of its own.
My question is this: Does free will exist?
No matter what exact definition of the phrase you use, free will implies that I have a choice in what I do. I could go for a walk now, or continue posting. A machine doesn't have free will. Even the actions of something as complicated as a computer are predetermined: You press a button, complicated things happen, and a letter appears on screen. Obviously it doesn't have a choice.
But then problems start to appear, because humans also seem to be complicated machines. From the single cells that make up our body, up to organs, tissues and the whole organism, everything happens just like in the machine example: Something happens to the body, complicated things happen inside it, and it reacts. There is no free will there.
But wait, it gets worse. The usual reply to that is: "Yes, but we obviously have free will, since I can choose to either keep posting, or go for a walk now." Which is a perfectly fine reply, apart from one flaw. The feeling of choice you have might be only that: a feeling.
To sum it up: I don't think free will exists. The term describes a feeling, nothing more.
All this brings into question whether or not we actually 'feel' free will.
If I have free will, than all is well. However, how do we know that we are only being made to belive in 'free will'. Do we actually have it, or is it a forced perception?
I think if at the start of the universe if the atoms and energy where how they where at the start, everything would happen how it has happened. If you understand so if the atoms where like that ww2 must happen and I must type this now. Our brains run in complex ways but we have no true free will. What will happen in 10 years time will happen in 10 years time. All your actions could have been predicted at the start of time(if somehow you knew everything then).
I would argue that there is no absolute free will. Wether decisions can be predetermined to some extent or partly random or dependant on physical states, in the end it the "choice" made is dependent entirely on the conditions, theres no question about that. And no, randomness doesn't generate free will just as a die doesn't have freewill.
There is no evidence for consciousness beyond what is formed physically, and even if there were, this consciousness would either be governed by its own set of rules or be random.
However, if you were to talk about free will in social terms, I don't think there can be a universal definition of free will. Some might say free will is the ability to make a decision without the influence of fear, while others may think that even without fear, conformity and learned behavior that leads to predictable decisions takes away that free will. Afterall, you have little choice over what you are told when you are young and many strive to fit in with their peers.
You can easily say no to peer pressure by being assertive and firm. But you probably won't because, well... It's peer pressure. Most people give in but you can stand your ground if you want to. I think it's not because we don't have free will, it's because we don't want to lose our friends.
We seem to be caught up on definitions. Since the question is a philosophical one, the appropriate thing is to have a philosophical definition of the concept.
Free Will def = Subject S has free will with respect to action A iff S could do otherwise than A.
There are a lot of different ways S could be prevented from doing otherwise than A. S could be physically restrained or lack a particular ability, but this isn't what we're talking about. What we mean by saying that S lacks free will is that S was determined (either physically or neurologically or whatever) to do A.
But given what we know, is there really a good argument for the claim that we have no free will? This would amount to the claim that, for any action and any subject, there is no subject with respect to any action such that a subject could do otherwise than the actions they did in fact. On the contrary, we have lots of evidence against this thesis. 1) It seems like we have free will. And this is the kind of "seeming" that justifies beliefs. It's unlike "mere" seemings where we can imagine the state of affairs of the actual world contradicting our seemings. Example: it could seem to me that the president is in New York City. But I have no basis for this mere seeming. I can easily imagine that, despite my seeming, a world in which the president is not in New York. On the other hand, I don't even know what to make of a world in which I don't have free will. This is much more than an unjustified "mere" seeming.
2) Our entirely ethical system is based around our having free will. Whether you're a pragmatist, realist, Quinean, Kantian, or whatever - denying free will as a matter of fact or truth is simply a mistake on this front. This isn't really an argument for accepting free will, but an argument for not rejecting the notion.
3) The consequences if there is no free will are not limited to ethics. Besides the damage such a notion would do to specific disciplines within philosophy, this would destroy inquisitive study altogether. After all, if we're predetermined to believe or not believe whatever in the context of inquiry, where's the motivation for pursuing this inquiry in the first place? It would seem to destroy our entire motivation as a people.
I agree that there is free will, because we have the right to make choices, however this 'will' is severely infringed upon by both society, and morality. You have the ability to do something, however the repercussions of the decision force you to choose something else, which I do not constitute as free will.
Free Will def = Subject S has free will with respect to action A iff S could do otherwise than A.
So when a possible action that is to take place is not determined, there is free will. With sufficient information, if you can predict the 'choice' to be made by subject S with absolute certainty, does this not remove his/her free will? Are you saying that predictable behavior can still count as free will?
On the other hand, I don't even know what to make of a world in which I don't have free will. This is much more than an unjustified "mere" seeming.
I don't understand your concept of seeming or what relevance it has to the argument.
Our entirely ethical system is based around our having free will. Whether you're a pragmatist, realist, Quinean, Kantian, or whatever - denying free will as a matter of fact or truth is simply a mistake on this front. This isn't really an argument for accepting free will, but an argument for not rejecting the notion.
How is it a mistake? The question is wether or not we have true free will at the very core of thinking, wether or not our actions are predetermined has no effect on our thoughs, values and logic since we don't know the future.
The consequences if there is no free will are not limited to ethics. Besides the damage such a notion would do to specific disciplines within philosophy, this would destroy inquisitive study altogether. After all, if we're predetermined to believe or not believe whatever in the context of inquiry, where's the motivation for pursuing this inquiry in the first place? It would seem to destroy our entire motivation as a people.
I don't see how the notion of having no free will can damage inquisitiveness. I don't think of it as being pulled into one eventual outcome despite all efforts to achieve otherwise, since we don't know the future. Even if we are predetermined to believe or not believe whatever, we do not get to the outcome instantanously. Humans are naturally inquisitive wether or not their actions and subjects of interests are predetermined. Their desire to know the unknown cannot be hindered by a lack of true free will. Even if all decisions can be predetermined if everything was known, it wont change the fact that there are things unknown by humans.
Since when did Rush come into the forums? (high five for anyone who gets the joke)
Well, I would say "having" free will is escientally not free will. If you're pressured into NOT doing something because everyone's doing something, you didn't make that choice from FREE WILL. The VS. you gave in the opening is a GREAT example of free will, and peer pressure. Free will is acted upon only by you, peer pressure, it doesn't matter if people are forcing you TO DO something, or forcing them NOT TO DO something.. it's still peer pressure.
The definition of free will as being able to make choices without outside stimulus affecting the outcome is ridiculous. If this were even possible it would be the deepest form of insanity. The ability to take action without knowing anything about your surroundings or situation. People with NO perception are corpses. Since this definition is inherently illogical we can't use it. The word would have no use so we have to use the definition of the ability to make a choice.
This is actually better. Wouldn't you rather have free will, as in being able to freely weigh options and choose what gives you the most pleasure. Or free will as in being able to make choices for no reason at all? Not because it makes you happy, not because you think it's the right thing to do, not even "because you felt like it" but for no reason. What would be the point in doing anything like that?
