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Forums → WEPR → Free Will
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The "Great Theists vs. Atheists"-thread spawned this interesting tangent, which is worthy a topic of its own.
My question is this: Does free will exist?
No matter what exact definition of the phrase you use, free will implies that I have a choice in what I do. I could go for a walk now, or continue posting.
A machine doesn't have free will. Even the actions of something as complicated as a computer are predetermined: You press a button, complicated things happen, and a letter appears on screen. Obviously it doesn't have a choice.
But then problems start to appear, because humans also seem to be complicated machines. From the single cells that make up our body, up to organs, tissues and the whole organism, everything happens just like in the machine example: Something happens to the body, complicated things happen inside it, and it reacts.
There is no free will there.
But wait, it gets worse.
The usual reply to that is: "Yes, but we obviously have free will, since I can choose to either keep posting, or go for a walk now."
Which is a perfectly fine reply, apart from one flaw. The feeling of choice you have might be only that: a feeling.
To sum it up: I don't think free will exists. The term describes a feeling, nothing more.
What do you think?
- 44 Replies
So when a possible action that is to take place is not determined, there is free will.
Yep. And all we need is one instance of this.
With sufficient information, if you can predict the 'choice' to be made by subject S with absolute certainty, does this not remove his/her free will? Are you saying that predictable behavior can still count as free will?
In principle, yes. However there are certainly instances where we can predict other people's behavior with extremely high (if not 100 percent) accuracy. For example, I know that if I offer my son some ice cream, he going to accept my offering and eat it.
So it's not sufficient for determinism that I have to predict just one action. In order for free will to exist, every action by every person must, in principle, be predictable.
I don't understand your concept of seeming or what relevance it has to the argument.
"It seems that X" is just to say that, from your point of view, X is intuitively true. In epistemology, we use seemings to motivate knowledge claims all the time.
Typically with seemings, they are doxastic notions (things we believe) but with little or no immediate evidence for these claims. Now, that's not to say there is no evidence.
Example: My wife comes home and I tell her that she seems upset. In other words, from my point of view, my wife is upset. I may not be able at that moment to explain why I feel that way. But odds are it's based off of her body language and facial expressions that I'm just picking up on.
Another example is the set of logical truths, like the law of excluded middle or the law of non-contradiction. We can't really explain why these things are true, they just seem to be true.
The reason seeming fits into this discussion is because it seems true (at least to most people) that we do, in fact, have free will. Well, it at least seems true to my intro to philosophy students. And this is just the sort of thing that seemings should justify - there are no clear and relevant defeaters, and it is a highly consistent kind of seeming.
How is it a mistake? The question is wether or not we have true free will at the very core of thinking, wether or not our actions are predetermined has no effect on our thoughs, values and logic since we don't know the future.
I wasn't talking about thoughts, values, and logic. These states could conceivably be what they are even in the absence of free will. But for S to be morally culpable or praiseworthy for performing action A, S must have the ability to choose whether or not to do A. We would have to completely rearrange our ethical standards to accommodate an absence of free will, I'm not sure that's something we can readily do.
I don't see how the notion of having no free will can damage inquisitiveness. I don't think of it as being pulled into one eventual outcome despite all efforts to achieve otherwise, since we don't know the future. Even if we are predetermined to believe or not believe whatever, we do not get to the outcome instantanously.
True, but if those outcomes are not a product of hard work and inquisitiveness, but rather a predetermined set of external factors, we risk losing the praise that should be due for discovering and inventing new things.
I realize this claim is kind of a stretch, but I thought it was something worth considering. At the end of day, even if this scenario doesn't obtain but everything else I mentioned does, we're still in a world of hurt.
Aha, I see Moe posting!
Typically with seemings, they are doxastic notions (things we believe) but with little or no immediate evidence for these claims. Now, that's not to say there is no evidence.
What's your stance on intuition in the context of epistemology?
True, but if those outcomes are not a product of hard work and inquisitiveness, but rather a predetermined set of external factors, we risk losing the praise that should be due for discovering and inventing new things.
I daresay this would only happen if one fell prey to that fatalistic trap of believing that if determinism then there is nothing worth feeling and all action is somehow meaningless. Even with a deterministic outlook, the experiences of inquisitiveness and joy of discovery and invention would still be meaningful, we'd still praise it all the same :P
I take the position that free will and determinism are not mutually exclusive. The idea of everything being 100% predictable just has no bearing on my particular nebulous and screwy idea of free will.
Let's go back to subject S. In situation Y, S has options A and B. Subject S chooses A. Will subject S choose A in all instances of Y*? Well I should hope so. What alternative is there? Madness?
A situation that calls for a decision is put in, a decision comes out. This decision will be based on what the subject's mental framework: His personality. More of a black box than a random number generator.
It seems to me that the very idea supposedly contrary to free will is the very thing that makes us who we are. This predictable behavoir in the face of a given situation is what makes us rational, unique, inventive and, ultimately, free.
*It is important to note that, in a real life situation, Y probably can't have multiple instances. When I say "situation Y", I mean the exact situation, accounting for all factors.
The subject of ethics is an important consideration. My view on it is thus: Subject S, given situation Y, has choices G and E, where G is good and E is evil. Subject S chooses E. He will choose E in all instances of Y. Why? Because of his previous experiences, genetics, ect. that makes him who he is, i.e. because he's the kind of person who does that sort of thing: A bad person. He has the ability to choose G, but, exercising his decision making abilities, he chooses E every time. He has free will, he is bad, he chooses bad because he's bad. His villainy is ethically reprehensible. Let's go rescue damsels.
Hmm. That's not completely satisfactory. I'll have to think about that some more.
I made a thread about free will some time ago.. no offense meant, just thought I'd look it up and post it here so that you may have a look at it. Have fun reading, I recommend taking a look.
i love rush greatest drummer EVER!
You're my new best friend. Free Will is a great song, and Neil Peart is indeed awesome.
Whoops, uh, where was I...
I personally believe that we do have a free will. Every day we are given choices. We have the ability to make choices. Sometimes those choices have constraints, sometimes they don't.
Let's use an example.
I can have either blueberry or apple pie.
I like both blueberry and apple pie.
I choose apple pie.
There you go, free will. There was no constraint to either of my actions, and I made a choice.
What's your stance on intuition in the context of epistemology?
Heh, funny you should ask - I'm actually in the process of writing a paper on that very thing.
The baseline is this: Regardless of whether it's epistemically valuable or not, intuition plays a HUGE role in epistemology. I think that, in the absence of defeaters, intuitive beliefs may serve a key role in developing foundational claims which we can then use to infer or justify other claims.
I'm hoping to develop this claim in a way that is palatable to internalist and externalist accounts of justification. Of course, there are always problems with an endeavor like this. My two big ones are 1) showing that intuition is a reliable truth tracking form of belief (to appeal to externalists) and 2) developing an account of justification for internalism about intuitions that isn't merely arbitrary.
That's all I can really say at this point on my thoughts, at least until I have a better idea of where I'm going. Probably after the paper is published. But in this case, I really do think the intuition that we have free will is evidence that that is the case.
I daresay this would only happen if one fell prey to that fatalistic trap of believing that if determinism then there is nothing worth feeling and all action is somehow meaningless. Even with a deterministic outlook, the experiences of inquisitiveness and joy of discovery and invention would still be meaningful, we'd still praise it all the same :P
Yeah, I'm definitely with you. I mean, it's a live option, but it's also a slippery slope. And whoever I was talking with before also made a good point that humans are naturally inquisitive, even in the absence of free will.
I'm fine with giving up this latter claim. It was something that crossed my mind while I was typing and decided to put it out there for consideration. I think the ethical considerations alone are enough to make us seriously think about whether or not to reject the notion of free will.
I take the position that free will and determinism are not mutually exclusive. The idea of everything being 100% predictable just has no bearing on my particular nebulous and screwy idea of free will.
From your first sentence, it seems clear that the kind of free will you're talking about isn't the kind that philosophers talk about. The two aren't just mutually exclusive, they're logically incompatible.
Let's go back to subject S. In situation Y, S has options A and B. Subject S chooses A. Will subject S choose A in all instances of Y*? Well I should hope so. What alternative is there? Madness?
You pointed out later on that there can't be multiple instances of Y, and I think you're right. But putting this worry aside (which we can totally do in thought experiments) can we think of an event such that S could conceivably do something other than A? I think so.
What about a contestant on a game show who has to choose between door A and door B? We can stipulate here that there are no external factors at that moment leading S in one particular direction. Will S always choose door A? If you say "yes" then it would seem you're committed to saying that something about S's past or biology or whatever contributed to S's decision. But doesn't it seem intuitively wrong to say that S would always choose door A in this situation?
If you don't like this example, I can give a template for generating other examples. All you need is a decision S must make that involves either a guess or an instant decision.
He has the ability to choose G, but, exercising his decision making abilities, he chooses E every time. He has free will, he is bad, he chooses bad because he's bad.
I think your worry that this scenario isn't satisfactory is because it's somewhat contradictory. Not outright or anything, but notice that you're bringing in the notion of choice - of free will - in considering a scenario that's determined by someone's biology (or perhaps in this case, their very nature).
Xzeno, I'd really like to you to think about and post what you consider free will to be - even if it's not the "hilosophically correct" definition. Your thoughts here seem to be compatible with what a lot of people feel about the situation, but can't seem to put into words. I'm in the same boat as you, I think. I want there to be free will, but I also realize how good at predicting certain things we have gotten.
Maybe free will is similar to a roulette spin. You can, in principle, predict it, but the determining factors are so many and so complex that, on a practical level, it's impossible. Even this outcome is problematic, though. I'm going to shut up now.
My view on it is thus: Subject S, given situation Y, has choices G and E, where G is good and E is evil. Subject S chooses E. He will choose E in all instances of Y. Why? Because of his previous experiences, genetics, ect. that makes him who he is, i.e. because he's the kind of person who does that sort of thing: A bad person. He has the ability to choose G, but, exercising his decision making abilities, he chooses E every time. He has free will, he is bad, he chooses bad because he's bad. His villainy is ethically reprehensible. Let's go rescue damsels.
When I say "situation Y", I mean the exact situation, accounting for all factors.
He has only two "choises"-G and E. He cannot phisically do one of them, and he has to phisically do another, or else break the laws of the universe. Why? because if I acount for situation Y like you did, then his hand (or foot) will have to take orders freom his brain. Still the brain, like everything, is made up of atoms and electrons. and each of them has an exact position in space, and an exact speed. Therefore, it is possible to count the future position of them in, say, 0.1 seconds using the simple laws of phisics.
Agree?
Now, we can do this exactly the same, except that now we can count the exact position of every particle in the universe and eveery energy in the universe. It can't be counted, but this still means that every particle has a specific path to take up till the end of the universe. meaning that you have no ree will. Neither do your future grand-grand-grand-grand-children.
I'm actually in the process of writing a paper on that very thing.
I knew it was something worth asking, I've seen a few arguments on the matter by people brandishing various qualifications over Livejournal :P But despite my tone, I figured it was quite the important topic. You've taken on something quite ambitious, trying to appease both camps, lemme know when you finish that paper!
Jumping disciplines slightly, perhaps there's a parallel to the claim that evidence of our consciousness lies in our thinking that we are conscious!
I still think that this thread deserves a bump. It well may be the key to the religious debating.
From your first sentence, it seems clear that the kind of free will you're talking about isn't the kind that philosophers talk about. The two aren't just mutually exclusive, they're logically incompatible.
Quick question just for clarification:
Does this include views such as soft determinism? You can go with the idea that (i) Determinism is true. (ii) People act freely whenever they perform actions that are both voluntary and unconstrained. and that because of this, (iii)People are morally responsible for their own actions whenever those actions are both voluntary and unconstrained.
This is, of course, defining voluntary as Action A if A is the result of A's agent choosing to do A, and unconstrained meaning that the behavior of action A's agent was not impeded in any usual way.
While I don't agree with soft determinism, it's definitely an interesting look at how actions can be completely determined, yet humans can still have free will in their choices. It also (somewhat) takes away the ethical concerns that arise with the stricter version of determinism that wolff seems to be taking up.
Does this include views such as soft determinism?
Soft determinism is going to end up with some ontological commitments that fall outside the discussion (at least on my understanding of it). Soft determinism is simply a qualified version of determinism (again, this is just how I view it, not an actual definition). Usually the soft determinist might say something like: All and only purely physical events are determined. But this is brings in an implicit comparative to things that aren't purely physical. So it seems like soft determinism is committed to an category of "things" that is non-physical (like a mental substance or the soul - something like that).
If they don't take on this commitment, it looks like SD runs the risk of inconsistency or arbitrariness. But if they do take on the commitment, they're accepting an additional premise that strong determinism wouldn't accept, as well as a lot of other philosophers for a variety of reasons.
unconstrained meaning that the behavior of action A's agent was not impeded in any usual way
Notice here the soft determinist is begging the question against the determinist with this definition. Their definition of unconstrained already excludes determinism as understood in the strong version. Combine this with their definition of voluntary, and the whole thing becomes philosophically uninteresting.
But again, that's just my take. This falls well outside my specialty.
the only way there could be tru free will if you kill somebody in cold blooded murder and nobody even trys to capture you because there are no rules rob a bank...money is yours do anything and anything is yours
WHICH SUCKS LIKE HELL i would rather be under control then out of it...
the only way there could be tru free will if you kill somebody in cold blooded murder and nobody even trys to capture you because there are no rules rob a bank...money is yours do anything and anything is yours
WHICH SUCKS LIKE HELL i would rather be under control then out of it...
So the people being robbed or not wanting a murder running around couldn't assert there free will to want those people captured?
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