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Just came across this interview with Al Plantinga on the irrationality of atheism. Plantinga is one of the most prominent philosophers of the 20th century, and it's a really fun read with lots of points to consider

Is Atheism Irrational?

Quotes from the interview provided by Moe:

(I take atheism to be the belief that there is no such person as the God of the theistic religions.)

No one thinks there is good evidence for the proposition that there are an even number of stars; but also, no one thinks the right conclusion to draw is that there are an uneven number of stars. The right conclusion would instead be agnosticism.

There is plenty of evidence against teapotism. So if, à la Russell, theism is like teapotism, the atheist, to be justified, would (like the a-teapotist) have to have powerful evidence against theism.

I should make clear first that I donât think arguments are needed for rational belief in God.

One presently rather popular argument: fine-tuning.

As a justification of atheism, this is pretty lame. We no longer need the moon to explain or account for lunacy; it hardly follows that belief in the nonexistence of the moon (a-moonism?) is justified.

Indeed, if theism is true, then very likely there is something like the sensus divinitatis. So claiming that the only sensible ground for belief in God is the explanatory quality of such belief is substantially equivalent to assuming atheism.

Thomas Nagel, a terrific philosopher and an unusually perceptive atheist, says he simply doesnât want there to be any such person as God.

Presumably this belief would have to be a material structure in my brain, say a collection of neurons that sends electrical impulses to other such structures as well as to nerves and muscles, and receives electrical impulses from other structures.

Because if this belief â" this structure â" had a totally different content (even, say, if it was a belief that there is no beer in the fridge) but had the same neurophysiological properties, it would still have caused that same action of going to the fridge.

This is some great stuff. I'm really happy with these responses so far. One thing to keep in mind, though: this is an interview and not a proper philosophical argument. There are some arguments on offer, but there's just not the room to fully develop them. Al is a brilliant philosopher and one of my personal heroes, so I'd like to work to defend him as much as I can.

The arguments in that link unfortunately fall down when you additionally consider that there are infinite possible number of Gods, and you can't worship them all, even the ones you know about.

Atheism is not a positive statement, it is the lack of belief in a deity. Can one call the lack of a statement irrational?

Not a good example in my opinion. Atheism is not about saying there is an uneven number of stars; two different theists would make the case of an even and uneven number of stars respectively, while the atheist would say there is no evidence for either claim.

Good point; though I feel that the position "I only believe it if I see it", or if there is enough evidence for it, should also be a viable option.

I'm unsure here... does he really claim that rational belief in god does not need arguments, while rational lack of belief in god does?

I disagree. It may only seem very appealing and logic to think that the fine-tuning of the universe to our condition is divine; but that's looking at it from the wrong side. Life is fine-tuned to the conditions in this universe, not the inverse.

I don't think I quite follow him there. Person 1 claiming to have sensus divinitatis does not make person 2 irrational for not having it. Care to brighten up my light?

There's a huge hole in this argument: what if a different content necessarily comes with a different electrophysiological property? The content would have to be material, so you cannot change a material structure without changing its influence on other material structures.

Why is Plantinga putting pantheism and other deistic faiths in with atheism?
Why is he regarding all atheism as gnostic atheism?

He clearly missed the entire purpose of Russel's tea pot analogy. In fact, he's got the entire argument back to front: The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence; and this applies as much to evidence against as it does to evidence for a belief.

He states that there are "at least a couple dozen arguments for theism", but where are they? Why should we assume that one "argument" is equally as valid as any other "argument"?

The only example he cited was a watchmaker argument grounded on the assumption that universal constants are just arbitrary values in the absence of divine intervention. The scenarios he mentions, "if the force of the Big Bang had been different by one part in 10 to the 60th..." and "[if] the ratio of the gravitational force to the force driving the expansion of the universe [...] had been even slightly different...", are the logical equivalent of a story told by an intoxicated Baron Munchhausen.

He later tries his own reductio ad absurdum, but fails miserably because he's trying to refute a refutation of his own argument. Id est, we no longer need to invoke the moon for lunacy, so we have no reason to believe in the moon. In trying to side-step his previous blunder, he's stumbled into two more; the erroneous conclusion that atheists have no other grounds for argument, and the erroneous conclusion that God of the gaps â¡ God in general.

His next statement is an appeal to the masses, finishing off with a circular argument; "if theism is true, then [...] claiming that the only sensible ground for belief in God is the explanatory quality of such belief is substantially equivalent to assuming atheism."

He then assumes that materialism is impossible to truly believe simply because he can't believe it, and goes on to explain this in terms that very neatly and effectively validate materialism. The "content" of a belief is the neurophysiological mechanism, but he does not seem to understand this. He either regards having a belief as flinging an instruction manual at a control panel, or assumes that a human being can only have one possible reason to perform an action. This reduces his remaining argument to little more than nonsensical gibberish.

His description of Thomas Nagel as an "unusually perceptive" atheist did not escape me, either.

A lack of belief would track to (strong) agnosticism. After all, these are people who withhold belief in a deity. So there's a failure to believe in a deity, but there's a strong belief that there is no deity - and that's atheism.

I see why you want to take this line. But I'm thinking your response here is motivated by your position on what an atheist does or does not believe. But if you're unsatisfied, there are other ways to run Plantinga's point here.

Plantinga talks quite a bit about this sensus divinitatis - a feeling of a divine presence. (Interestingly this sensation has been replicated in clinical studies by introducing the brain to strong electromagnetic fields.) This is something that Plantinga takes seriously and suggests that such a sense is to be expected if there is a God. Like our other perceptions, we don't need argumentation for rational belief in those things. If I see a barn in front of me, it's rational to believe that there's a barn in front of me. No argumentation is really needed here.

I personally completely agree with you here. But there's an argument along these lines that develops what's called the Merchant's Thumb Principal. Suppose you're buying a rug and the merchant holds it up for you to inspect. It look fine so you buy it. When you get home, you realise there's a hole in the rug and the merchant's thumb was covering it up. This is so improbable that it can't be an accident - it cries for an explanation. In the same way, our universe has a number of factors that are way more improbable. And in the same way this cries for an explanation.

These are some complex issues in the philosophy of mind. This is already a really long post, so I don't want to go into them just yet. Actually, the compatibility of materialism with evolution would warrant a thread of its own. Feel free to ask me on my profile, or perhaps we could start a new thread with this topic. This stuff doesn't really affect the atheist position, however, since atheists don't have to be materialists to begin with.

A lack of belief would track to (strong) agnosticism. After all, these are people who withhold belief in a deity. So there's a failure to believe in a deity, but there's a strong belief that there is no deity - and that's atheism.

No one thinks there is good evidence for the proposition that there are an even number of stars; but also, no one thinks the right conclusion to draw is that there are an uneven number of stars. The right conclusion would instead be agnosticism.

Getting back to the article, sorry for the triple post. I was hoping someone would post between now and then.

I disagree: Clearly we have a great deal of evidence against teapotism. For example, as far as we know, the only way a teapot could have gotten into orbit around the sun would be if some country with sufficiently developed space-shot capabilities had shot this pot into orbit. No country with such capabilities is sufficiently frivolous to waste its resources by trying to send a teapot into orbit. Furthermore, if some country had done so, it would have been all over the news; we would certainly have heard about it. But we havenât. And so on. There is plenty of evidence against teapotism. So if, à la Russell, theism is like teapotism, the atheist, to be justified, would (like the a-teapotist) have to have powerful evidence against theism.

The so-called âproblem of evilâ would presumably be the strongest (and maybe the only) evidence against theism. It does indeed have some strength; it makes sense to think that the probability of theism, given the existence of all the suffering and evil our world contains, is fairly low.

I should make clear first that I donât think arguments are needed for rational belief in God. In this regard belief in God is like belief in other minds, or belief in the past. Belief in God is grounded in experience, or in the sensus divinitatis, John Calvinâs term for an inborn inclination to form beliefs about God in a wide variety of circumstances.

One presently rather popular argument: fine-tuning. Scientists tell us that there are many properties our universe displays such that if they were even slightly different from what they are in fact, life, or at least our kind of life, would not be possible. The universe seems to be fine-tuned for life.

Some atheists seem to think that a sufficient reason for atheism is the fact (as they say) that we no longer need God to explain natural phenomena â" lightning and thunder for example. We now have science.

As a justification of atheism, this is pretty lame. We no longer need the moon to explain or account for lunacy; it hardly follows that belief in the nonexistence of the moon (a-moonism?) is justified. A-moonism on this ground would be sensible only if the sole ground for belief in the existence of the moon was its explanatory power with respect to lunacy. (And even so, the justified attitude would be agnosticism with respect to the moon, not a-moonism.) The same thing goes with belief in God: Atheism on this sort of basis would be justified only if the explanatory power of theism were the only reason for belief in God. And even then, agnosticism would be the justified attitude, not atheism.

Thomas Nagel, a terrific philosopher and an unusually perceptive atheist, says he simply doesnât want there to be any such person as God.

Well, if there are only material entities, then atheism certainly follows. But there is a really serious problem for materialism: It canât be sensibly believed, at least if, like most materialists, you also believe that humans are the product of evolution.

I canât give a complete statement of the argument here â" for that see Chapter 10 of âWhere the Conflict Really Lies.â But, roughly, hereâs why. First, if materialism is true, human beings, naturally enough, are material objects. Now what, from this point of view, would a belief be? My belief that Marcel Proust is more subtle that Louis LâAmour, for example? Presumably this belief would have to be a material structure in my brain, say a collection of neurons that sends electrical impulses to other such structures as well as to nerves and muscles, and receives electrical impulses from other structures.

But in addition to such neurophysiological properties, this structure, if it is a belief, would also have to have a content: It would have, say, to be the belief that Proust is more subtle than LâAmour.

GG: So your claim is that if materialism is true, evolution doesnât lead to most of our beliefs being true.

AP: Right. In fact, given materialism and evolution, it follows that our belief-producing faculties are not reliable.

Hereâs why. If a belief is as likely to be false as to be true, weâd have to say the probability that any particular belief is true is about 50 percent.

Plantinga is one of the most prominent philosophers of the 20th century

The universe seems to be fine-tuned for life.

Due to the universe being an infinite space, probability dictates at least one planet can have life.

Infinite space, or infinite number of systems, is not an observed fact. But if there was an infinite number of planets, probability would dictate an infinite number of planets able to sustain life.

I can't stress enough that the teapot is being horribly misrepresented in the interview.

Russellâs idea, I take it, is we donât really have any evidence against teapotism, but we donât need any; the absence of evidence is evidence of absence, and is enough to support a-teapotism. We donât need any positive evidence against it to be justified in a-teapotism; and perhaps the same is true of theism.

... we would certainly have heard about [such a teapot]. But we havenât. And so on. There is plenty of evidence against teapotism. So if, à la Russell, theism is like teapotism, the atheist, to be justified, would (like the a-teapotist) have to have powerful evidence against theism.

These are all some really well though out and compelling criticisms of Plantinga's position. In his defence, I would like to reiterate that none of this constitutes a proper philosophical argument. Al is a brilliant, charitable, and kind philosopher who has made a tremendous impact in his field. But at the end of the day, I have to completely agree with you guys. I genuinely have nothing to offer in his defence. His stuff on the how physicalism (materialism) doesn't motivate atheism, however, is incredibly interesting on its own. If anyone is interested we could start a thread on this alone.

I do, however, want to further explore one point that Plantinga made regarding the problem of evil. What I'd like to do is present an argument that's up for refutation. The first person to successfully refute (by my assessment) the argument would earn themselves a merit. Just a fun little contest if anyone is interested. (There's a selfish element here too because I find this to be a compelling response to the problem of evil - one which I've developed.)

It may be necessary to first solve the problem of coming to a workable agreed-upon definition of evil.