ForumsWEPRKnowledge of the External World

46 8128
Moegreche
offline
Moegreche
3,826 posts
Duke

So I thought it might be fun to assess an argument that seems to show we can never know if material objects exists without being perceived. It'll help if you really engage this post and think about these questions as they come up.

So, first: How do we usually verify facts? If I tell you "There's a blue pen on the table," how do you determine if what I said is true? Think about it.
If you're a normal person, you probably said something like "Go look and see if it's there," which is precisely how we verify statements of fact like that. We have to observe the world around us to determine which statements of fact are true.

Second: We would really like to say that material objects (chairs, tables, pens) exist without being perceived (without anyone or anything observing them). This just seems intuitively true - mountains don't disappear just because no one sees them.

Here's the problem: We have a statement of fact, something like "Material objects exist even when unobserved." We would really like this statement to be true, but how do we verify it? No, really. How do we verify this statement to be true?

What we have is a statement that is talking about all unobserved events. As soon as we try to observe these events/material objects they are no longer unobserved. So it seems we can NEVER verify a statement like "All objects continue to exist unobserved."
Therefore, we can never know whether or not material objects exist independently of the mind.

Here's the argument shortened:

1) We must make empirical observations to determine whether or not statement of fact are true.
2) The statement (M) "Material objects exist unobserved - independently of the mind" defines a specific class of observations (O) {x| x is not observed}
3) Any event/object that is observed would not be a member of the set (O).
So, (From 1 and 3) the statement (M) can never be verified.


I suppose we'd need another argument that basically says if something can't be verified then it isn't knowable to get the conclusion. This may be a point of contention.
I'd really like to destroy this argument, if we can.

  • 46 Replies
Freakenstein
offline
Freakenstein
9,504 posts
Jester

Material objects exist as they are, even when unobserved."?


Are we talking about independent observing and dependent observing or total gathered information? For the former: We ourselves may not know whether or not this and this is here or real, but this is why we have others beside us to relay us the information given. For example, space organizations are always uploading new pics of the beyond that shows just how vast the universe is, whereas with the commonfolk, we either see with our eyes or telescopes that we own, or we are dependent on the information that said organizations give. For the latter, well... the vastness of what little information we have already goes beyond the bounds of the Milky Way. We just have to assume that there is "more out there besides this one" for now, and when we have enough technology to explore deeper, we can find out for ourselves this mystery.
Kragoth
offline
Kragoth
85 posts
Nomad

That's certainly the most plausible state of affairs and the way we would like things to be.


I think it's a very interesting thing to discus, but, to understand it better myself: If we observe something, by looking at it for example, we simply 'catch' the photons that bounce off of the atoms of the object with our eyes, and thus we see it. We ourselves don't send any energy or whatever to the object.
I can understand that, when we do not really see it at a moment, we can't be 100% sure that it is there, but isn't it as good as 100% certain that it is? At least with stuff on this earth, not talking about universes 100 milion light years away.
MageGrayWolf
offline
MageGrayWolf
9,462 posts
Farmer

What impact does us observing an item have on the item itself? Nothing I think.


On a quantum level that's not the case.
The Double-Slit Experiment
Strop
offline
Strop
10,816 posts
Bard

What impact does us observing an item have on the item itself?


Isn't this the basis of Heisenberg's Uncertainty principle?
Kragoth
offline
Kragoth
85 posts
Nomad

On a quantum level that's not the case.
The Double-Slit Experiment


Cool, awesome link!
But that was with a measuring device.
When they simply looked at it (only with their eyes) it did not change the wave effect.
So when watching (not measuring) a pen for example, you wouldn't change anything, would you? So when you don't watch it anymore, it still would be the same, wouldn't it?
Or am I still thinking to basic? :P
lightcrux
offline
lightcrux
622 posts
Peasant

So when watching (not measuring) a pen for example, you wouldn't change anything, would you? So when you don't watch it anymore, it still would be the same, wouldn't it?


Not quite. You see, the electron behaved as if it was being watched. According to the Uncertainty Principle you can't measure the momentum and the position of a particle (electron, in this case) with perfect accuracy. If momentum is accurately determined then the position can never be determined (hence, a probability always exists). That is, to an extent, the case with YDSE. The electron, when observed w.r.t us, "split up" into two parts to pass through the slits to self-interfere.

I assume we must closely look at the observer for a plausible explanation. You see, the effect of an observer his surroundings is more prominent than noticed. I reckon, it is because of the fact that he notices the interference, which causes his previously theorized assumptions to breakdown.
FireflyIV
offline
FireflyIV
3,224 posts
Nomad

it's just not an intuitively plausible position.


That's the point of ''cogito ero sum''. You can't actually prove that you exist. You just have to assume it. After all, perhaps I am a butterfly dreaming of myself (and if that's the case, would you please dream more supermodels in my case butterfly).

Is it required that we know every possible alternative to know some matter of fact?


Occam's Razor however says that hypothesis should make as few assumptions as possible. In this particular case, there are two assumptions for the basis of reality, 1) that it's possible to simulate artificial intelligences in such a manner that they don't know they are being simulated, and 2) that once such simulations are possible, we will spawn billions of them.

Neither of these assumptions are particularly wild, and they seem to be where we are headed. It isn't a question of finding each possible alternative in this particular case, seeing as there are only two possibilities, that the world is real, or that it is a simulation, therefore it probably isn't pointless to delve more deeply into this.
Moegreche
offline
Moegreche
3,826 posts
Duke

That's the point of ''cogito ero sum''. You can't actually prove that you exist


While I agree that I can't prove that I exist as I believe myself to be, the cogito argument does prove that I exist in some capacity. This is precisely what Descartes was trying to do: find something that was absolutely certain.
So, even if I am in a simulation or being wildly deceived, I (whatever I happen to be) must exist in order to be deceived. The simple fact that I am aware of things means that I stand in some relation to them and so I must exist. I am, as Descartes would put it, a thinking thing.

The only reason I'm pointing this out is because if we can be absolutely certain of our own existence, it seems even more problematic that we can't prove the existence of anything else.

Occam's Razor however says that hypothesis should make as few assumptions as possible. In this particular case, there are two assumptions for the basis of reality, 1) that it's possible to simulate artificial intelligences in such a manner that they don't know they are being simulated, and 2) that once such simulations are possible, we will spawn billions of them.


I have an easier time accepting (2) than (1). Artificial intelligence is a tricky little critter and I'm not sure it's possible. There are things we can conceive of that have been proven to be "unprogrammable" in a computer. Hopefully you guys can just take my word on this point.
Of course, the fact that we can't program this kind of thought directly may not mean anything, but it is a point to keep in mind. Especially if it gets us out of the simulation argument.
But I completely agree with you that we should still keep all the skeptical scenarios around as live options. But perhaps rather than getting caught up in particular scenarios, we can just lump them all together as "massive deception" scenarios.


Going back to the point made about how our observations can alter the behavior of subatomic and quantum particles: what sort of implications (if any) does this fact have about our relation to the external world?
Can we use this information to construct an argument for or against our direct access to material objects?
My worry is that by talking about particles we can't actually "see", we're developing even further the idea that what we are aware of when we "see" objects is not the objects themselves at all. As someone pointed out earlier, our eyes simply capture light waves that are bouncing off the surfaces of these objects.
This problem becomes even more apparent when we consider what it is we're seeing when we look at a distant star, say in the Andromeda galaxy, 2 million light years away.
A distant star could have been destroyed hundreds of thousands of years ago, but we're still looking at light that left the star 2 million years ago. But if all we're seeing is light, how can we get from that to an actual object?
Parsat
offline
Parsat
2,180 posts
Blacksmith

Going back to the point made about how our observations can alter the behavior of subatomic and quantum particles: what sort of implications (if any) does this fact have about our relation to the external world?


From what I can tell, the idea and implications are summed up in Plato's Cave, where our perceptions are really the basis for what we know and deduce. Following this thought, it's not physically possible for us to "know" the external world without the middlemen, because we still need the light to hit our retinas, cause some action potentials to shooting into our brain, and have our occipital lobes work on it. Somehow, though, there is something within us that tells us that what we perceive is the object, that allows us to draw a correlation from our perception to the object, and that for the sake of our lives we should accept it as true. What is it?

The one thing I'm not very keen about is all the "brain in a vat" conjectures (or Firefly's butterfly dream), because there's little real reason why it should affect our lives in the first place at all if it were true. Of course, that kind of thought makes me a crappy philosopher.
Moegreche
offline
Moegreche
3,826 posts
Duke

because there's little real reason why it should affect our lives in the first place at all if it were true. Of course, that kind of thought makes me a crappy philosopher.

On the contrary, some very famous philosophers have held this same position, which is known as pragmatism.
If some statement of fact doesn't make any practical difference on our lives, then it is meaningless. Whether we're brains in vats or not, our experience is qualitatively the same. So, the question of being deceived or simulated becomes meaningless.
Maybe this is how we can approach this question of the external world. How we perceive the world is just how we perceive it, and any question assessing the correctness of our perceptions is just meaningless...
Strop
offline
Strop
10,816 posts
Bard

How we perceive the world is just how we perceive it, and any question assessing the correctness of our perceptions is just meaningless...


While we're not directly contemplating hard problems of consciousness, I'd like to rejoin with a Dennett paraphrase I frequently throw around: consciousness is the process which convinces us that we are conscious :P
WexMajor82
offline
WexMajor82
1,026 posts
Nomad

You know, I had to study almost all this stuff in my tertiary school.
I find it pretty weird to discuss it in a forum....

Strop
offline
Strop
10,816 posts
Bard

I find it pretty weird to discuss it in a forum....


I not-so-proudly present you with my phil. credentials: a self-initiated correspondance course from the Stanford Online Encyclopedia of Philosophy... and some hours wasted in Livejournal communities before I realised most of them were more interested in blowing up their e-pen0r.
WexMajor82
offline
WexMajor82
1,026 posts
Nomad

I not-so-proudly present you with my phil. credentials: a self-initiated correspondance course from the Stanford Online Encyclopedia of Philosophy... and some hours wasted in Livejournal communities before I realised most of them were more interested in blowing up their e-pen0r.


Well, you exposed in a more explicit way what I was thinking...
But people go on! I want to see the end of this thread!
FireflyIV
offline
FireflyIV
3,224 posts
Nomad

While I agree that I can't prove that I exist as I believe myself to be, the cogito argument does prove that I exist in some capacity. This is precisely what Descartes was trying to do: find something that was absolutely certain.


I've always found Descartes' view a bit wishy washy. For example, if John has multiple personalities, does each of them exist individually? Or are they all John, who just occassionally thinks he is Fred, or Henry, or Jasmine? Descartes implies that each of these people exist in the realm of John's mind as separate people, which makes psycho therapy something of a moral quandrary; re integrating John would in essence mean maiming someone's psyche.

By the same token, there's no reason the deceiving god descartes put forth isn't just hallucinating that he's several billion people. Even if they think, do they necessarily exist? They are just the daydreams of a vastly more intelligent being, subsets of its personality.

The one thing I'm not very keen about is all the "brain in a vat" conjectures (or Firefly's butterfly dream), because there's little real reason why it should affect our lives in the first place at all if it were true. Of course, that kind of thought makes me a crappy philosopher.


I think Plato shows great wisdom in this regard using his cave analogy. In fact, I consider myself, to some degree a Platonist, except the ideas about physical particulars (yea I know, it's crazy), I think his analogy is spot on.

However Parsat, I think it is difficult to differentiate between those in chains in the cave and those in the Sun. The ones in chains think themselevs pretty wise, due to the subtle patterns they observe in the shadows of the cave, and thus declare they understand all of existence, thus although I believe these tiers exist to some degree, I acknoweldge it's very difficult to tell is truly enlightened, which is really an admirable aim, even from the view of a pragmatist.

Plato also acknowledges that ignorance is often truly bliss. In the allegaory, the sun outside the cave drives people back into the darkness because they can't handle its brightness. But also recall that in Plato's Republic, he states that the philosopher kings should not gain power by ambition, rather that the reluctant one who knows the horrible truth about great responsibility is typically the most level headed. Not only are the philosopher kings chosen by objective and absolute criteria, but they are also identifiable through the apparent pain they endure through the realisation of certain truths.

I guess what I'm trying to say is that searching for the truth is not always the pathway to leading to the most content life, however I still believe it is preferrable to willful ignorance. Take the Matrix for example (I'm sorry it had to come to this): The Matrix provides its inhabitants with a perfectly functional normal life in 1999, it is much happier than the horrible truth about man's depravity, starvation and incessant war. However the writers compellingly show that the truth can be at odds with happiness, but it still must be pursued.
Showing 16-30 of 46