That's the point of ''cogito ero sum''. You can't actually prove that you exist
While I agree that I can't prove that I exist as I believe myself to be, the cogito argument does prove that I exist in some capacity. This is precisely what Descartes was trying to do: find something that was absolutely certain.
So, even if I am in a simulation or being wildly deceived, I (whatever I happen to be) must exist in order to be deceived. The simple fact that I am aware of things means that I stand in some relation to them and so I must exist. I am, as Descartes would put it, a thinking thing.
The only reason I'm pointing this out is because if we can be absolutely certain of our own existence, it seems even more problematic that we can't prove the existence of anything else.
Occam's Razor however says that hypothesis should make as few assumptions as possible. In this particular case, there are two assumptions for the basis of reality, 1) that it's possible to simulate artificial intelligences in such a manner that they don't know they are being simulated, and 2) that once such simulations are possible, we will spawn billions of them.
I have an easier time accepting (2) than (1). Artificial intelligence is a tricky little critter and I'm not sure it's possible. There are things we can conceive of that have been proven to be "unprogrammable" in a computer. Hopefully you guys can just take my word on this point.
Of course, the fact that we can't program this kind of thought directly may not mean anything, but it is a point to keep in mind. Especially if it gets us out of the simulation argument.
But I completely agree with you that we should still keep all the skeptical scenarios around as live options. But perhaps rather than getting caught up in particular scenarios, we can just lump them all together as "massive deception" scenarios.
Going back to the point made about how our observations can alter the behavior of subatomic and quantum particles: what sort of implications (if any) does this fact have about our relation to the external world?
Can we use this information to construct an argument for or against our direct access to material objects?
My worry is that by talking about particles we can't actually "see", we're developing even further the idea that what we are aware of when we "see" objects is not the objects themselves at all. As someone pointed out earlier, our eyes simply capture light waves that are bouncing off the surfaces of these objects.
This problem becomes even more apparent when we consider what it is we're seeing when we look at a distant star, say in the Andromeda galaxy, 2 million light years away.
A distant star could have been destroyed hundreds of thousands of years ago, but we're still looking at light that left the star 2 million years ago. But if all we're seeing is light, how can we get from that to an actual object?