Newcomb's paradox - Armor Games Community

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Einfach

1,448 posts

Nomad

Posted January 11, '11 3:08am UTC

Note also that in both these examples, you end up BETTER OFF than both Freakenstein's examples!

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driejen

486 posts

Nomad

Posted January 11, '11 3:11am UTC

I would take the closed box only. If he can predict my decision, then he most likely has predicted my thought processes. I know that what I do then has no effect on the past, but when I think about that then I have to realise that the being has foreseen this speculation in my mind. If this being truly can predict my decision and hence my reasoning, then whatever I have chosen has already been predicted as is when I do choose. This is in conflict with the idea that my actions have no effect in the past, but I have to take the beings word for it and choose the closed box only, else I take an empty box as the being so then predicted.

This is circular logic if not logic-breaking, but what can you do when you work with a supposed being that can predict accurately while still confronting you in this situation?

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Freakenstein

9,504 posts

Jester

Posted January 11, '11 3:45am UTC

Note also that in both these examples, you end up BETTER OFF than both Freakenstein's examples!

This is circular logic if not logic-breaking, but what can you do when you work with a supposed being that can predict accurately while still confronting you in this situation?

Either way, you can argue that the supposed being is correct only because he makes the solutions so effortless. If he claims that he can predict the actions of all the participants, then proceeds to say that if you pick the closed box, you will win a million dollars, common sense dictates that 999 people will all choose the same answer, the closed box.

Either way, this experiment has one independent variable and too many errors.

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driejen

486 posts

Nomad

Posted January 11, '11 3:59am UTC

Either way, you can argue that the supposed being is correct only because he makes the solutions so effortless. If he claims that he can predict the actions of all the participants, then proceeds to say that if you pick the closed box, you will win a million dollars, common sense dictates that 999 people will all choose the same answer, the closed box.

You can argue that the being cannot truely make absolute predictions and is fraudulent yes, but I intend to try to come to some solution based on the assumed position that the being can indeed make absolute predictions. When confronted with a real life situation, I would of course factor in the possibility of absolute predictability being achievable by said being thus I would choose both boxes. But assuming in this scenario that the being can undoubtedly make absolute predictions, I would choose to take the closed box only.

Also after thinking about it for a little more and reading the page again, I have something else to add to my previous post.

The idea that current actions have no effect on the past is actually in direct conflict with the prediction, since an absolute prediction implies that my predicted action(current) has a relationship and inherently an effect to the prediction(past). An absolute prediction would have to take into account anything that happens between the time of the prediction and the predicted event, thus any action concerning the prediction does indeed affect the prediction itself(if absolute). I would say this is an argument against the feasability of absolute predictions.

[quote]Either way, you can argue that the supposed being is correct only because he makes the solutions so effortless. If he claims that he can predict the actions of all the participants, then proceeds to say that if you pick the closed box, you will win a million dollars, common sense dictates that 999 people will all choose the same answer, the closed box.[/quote]\r\n\r\nYou can argue that the being cannot truely make absolute predictions and is fraudulent yes, but I intend to try to come to some solution based on the assumed position that the being can indeed make absolute predictions. When confronted with a real life situation, I would of course factor in the possibility of absolute predictability being achievable by said being thus I would choose both boxes. But assuming in this scenario that the being can undoubtedly make absolute predictions, I would choose to take the closed box only.\r\n\r\nAlso after thinking about it for a little more and reading the page again, I have something else to add to my previous post.\r\n\r\nThe idea that current actions have no effect on the past is actually in direct conflict with the prediction, since an absolute prediction implies that my predicted action(current) has a relationship and inherently an effect to the prediction(past). An absolute prediction would have to take into account anything that happens between the time of the prediction and the predicted event, thus any action concerning the prediction does indeed affect the prediction itself(if absolute). I would say this is an argument against the feasability of absolute predictions.

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Einfach

1,448 posts

Nomad

Posted January 11, '11 4:17am UTC

Does predicting the future imply the ability to change the past? Newcomb's problem assumes that this is not true, as this is the basis for the paradox part.

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Moegreche

3,826 posts

Duke

Posted January 11, '11 7:18am UTC

I thought I'd explain things a bit. The paradox is a bit tricky, and Kiekeben could've done a better job of explaining it.

First off: this scenario is only a paradox for decision theory. In order to really understand the paradox, you need to have a good grasp of decision theory, and at least an inkling of what the expected utility and dominance principles are.
Also, the reason this is a paradox is not (as Kiekeben suggests) because there are compelling reasons to take both sides. The reason it's a paradox has to do with the results you get when you use a particular decision scheme, say, dominance. Basically, if it's true (according to dominance) that you should take the closed box, then it becomes false that you should take the closed box.
Note, this is not the same as something being true and false at the same time. That's just incoherent.

I can further explain the paradox if you guys really want to talk about it. It's actually quite interesting, but only when you look at it in the light of decision theory.
Since this paradox came around, though, there have been new principles within decision theory. Thus, the paradox becomes a false dilemma.
Actually, I need to think on how this paradox would affect Mark Kaplan's Modest Probabilism. ..

I thought I'd explain things a bit. The paradox is a bit tricky, and Kiekeben could've done a better job of explaining it.\r\n\r\nFirst off: this scenario is only a paradox for decision theory. In order to really understand the paradox, you need to have a good grasp of decision theory, and at least an inkling of what the expected utility and dominance principles are.\r\nAlso, the reason this is a paradox is not (as Kiekeben suggests) because there are compelling reasons to take both sides. The reason it's a paradox has to do with the results you get when you use a particular decision scheme, say, dominance. Basically, if it's true (according to dominance) that you should take the closed box, then it becomes false that you should take the closed box.\r\nNote, this is not the same as something being true and false at the same time. That's just incoherent.\r\n\r\nI can further explain the paradox if you guys really want to talk about it. It's actually quite interesting, but only when you look at it in the light of decision theory.\r\nSince this paradox came around, though, there have been new principles within decision theory. Thus, the paradox becomes a false dilemma.\r\nActually, I need to think on how this paradox would affect Mark Kaplan's Modest Probabilism. ..

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Moegreche

3,826 posts

Duke

Posted January 11, '11 7:21am UTC

The opposing solutions (as was said in the link) aren't equally strong. In fact, it's more rational to take the closed box than both.

Just to make it perfectly clear, the solutions to the paradox are not a) take the closed box or b) take both boxes. The solutions are those offered by the relevant decision theories under consideration: expected utility and dominance. It's the analysis given by these principles that generates the paradox. That's why an understanding of them is necessary for an understanding of the paradox.

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Moegreche

3,826 posts

Duke

Posted January 11, '11 7:28am UTC

Sorry for the triple post, just thought of a fun question:

Suppose I entered the room and decided to just flip a coin. If it lands heads, I'll take the closed box. If it lands tails, I'll take both boxes.

The question:
Does this avoid the paradox? If so, does this run into different problems?

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MageGrayWolf

9,462 posts

Farmer

Posted January 11, '11 7:44am UTC

Since the money would or would not be in the closed box prior to my decision I would shake the closed box. At most it would be in the form of 100 $10,000 dollar bills, that should be enough to hear or if the box is thin enough feel move around inside. I also don't see anything indicating I can't touch the boxes prior to my decision. I don't see anything indicating I can't look inside the closed box prior to choosing either but I'm guessing that is implied.

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Einfach

1,448 posts

Nomad

Posted January 11, '11 7:49am UTC

We run into this problem because for the Being to predict the future, when you are put into this situation, the box has already been determined, or so it seems, so for the being to be right, it seems as though your decision affects its past decision of deciding whether the money should be in the box or not in the first place.

This leads us to either 1 of 2 conclusions if the closed box solution is right:
Either we have no free will and one can predict the future using physics or
We do have free will, but the present affects past events...

Now - Moegreches question with the coin flip; well, are there any truly random processes in the universe?
You can mimic randomness by, for example, computers looking at the Date and Time to generate seemingly random numbers, but these numbers are not truly random - they just create an illusion of randomness.
So, as one could calculate the forces acting upon the coin, I guess technically the Being could too.

BUT there's one thing we could try - combining SchrÃ¶dinger's cat with Newcomb's problem; if the cat is alive, choose both boxes and if it dead, choose the closed box.

We run into this problem because for the Being to predict the future, when you are put into this situation, the box has already been determined, or so it seems, so for the being to be right, it seems as though your decision affects its past decision of deciding whether the money should be in the box or not in the first place.\r\n\r\nThis leads us to either 1 of 2 conclusions if the closed box solution is right:\r\nEither we have no free will and one can predict the future using physics or\r\nWe do have free will, but the present affects past events...\r\n\r\nNow - Moegreches question with the coin flip; well, are there any truly random processes in the universe?\r\nYou can mimic randomness by, for example, computers looking at the Date and Time to generate seemingly random numbers, but these numbers are not truly random - they just create an illusion of randomness.\r\nSo, as one could calculate the forces acting upon the coin, I guess technically the Being could too.\r\n\r\n[b]BUT there's one thing we could try - combining [url=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SchrÃ¶dinger's_cat]SchrÃ¶dinger's cat[/url] with Newcomb's problem; if the cat is alive, choose both boxes and if it dead, choose the closed box.[/b]

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Einfach

1,448 posts

Nomad

Posted January 11, '11 7:54am UTC

Since the money would or would not be in the closed box prior to my decision I would shake the closed box. At most it would be in the form of 100 $10,000 dollar bills, that should be enough to hear or if the box is thin enough feel move around inside. I also don't see anything indicating I can't touch the boxes prior to my decision. I don't see anything indicating I can't look inside the closed box prior to choosing either but I'm guessing that is implied.

Well, seeing as once you shake it, you will know whether or not there is the $1,000,000 in it, the Being will have predicted that you would pick both boxes, as it is beneficial in both scenarios to pick both boxes, thus thwarting your chance of getting any money.

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MageGrayWolf

9,462 posts

Farmer

Posted January 11, '11 8:07am UTC

Well, seeing as once you shake it, you will know whether or not there is the $1,000,000 in it, the Being will have predicted that you would pick both boxes, as it is beneficial in both scenarios to pick both boxes, thus thwarting your chance of getting any money.

No, as I said I would shake it prior to my decision. The beings prediction is already set. So if I detect the money in the closed box I take just the closed box, getting the $1,000,000. If I don't detect the money in the closed box I take both boxes just getting $1,000. It's all contingent on what the being predicted I would choose prior to my choosing.

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Endscape

1,182 posts

Nomad

Posted January 11, '11 8:13am UTC

in this case i would be walking away with a million dollars...it would seem that the result is based upon character, which would direct how u would think the moment after the question is posed to u. Normally i am very blunt in decision making, "either or" there is no in between plus this isnt a run of the mill "genie of the lamp" question where there are a thousand tricks.. so it boils down to(as well as i could interpret) wat u thought the MOMENT after the question was posed...

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Endscape

1,182 posts

Nomad

Posted January 11, '11 8:27am UTC

(sorry continuing where i left off) i.e. "HA easy money ill just take both and have even more" or "hmmmm which ONE do i pick" -which would be my thoughts... that being said i would choose the possible million instantly and get it without a problem unless there was some un-foreseen "genie-esque" catch to my choice.... that being said is the answer Endscape has for this question.

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Moegreche

3,826 posts

Duke

Posted January 11, '11 8:49am UTC

We run into this problem because for the Being to predict the future, when you are put into this situation, the box has already been determined, or so it seems, so for the being to be right, it seems as though your decision affects its past decision of deciding whether the money should be in the box or not in the first place.

It hasn't been determined. That's not part of the setup. The problem comes in the form of how we use decision theory to make a decision.

I would shake the closed box.

This, too, is missing the point of the thought experiment. You are to choose base on the evidence you have. The reason the box is closed is so that you can't assess a confidence level on the contents of the box.

the result is based upon character

Not based on character. Based on decision theory.

All of these issues you guys are raising aren't pertinent to the paradox. As I said, you need to understand decision theory to see how this paradox fits in.
We could talk in circles all day about, say, Russell's Paradox. But unless you understand logic and set theory, it's not going to be fruitful discussion. A solution to the paradox would be one that uses decision theory that avoids the paradox while not succumbing to other standard problems.

combining SchrÃÂ¶dinger's cat with Newcomb's problem

The Schrodinger's Cat thought experiment is a reductio of certain interpretations of quantum phenomena. It is not some sort of random number generator, if that's what you're looking for.
A coin flip, philosophically speaking, is merely an event with an outcome space of 2 (heads, tails) and that has evenly distributed probability - 50/50. If Newcomb gets to posit a supercomputer that can predict human behavior, then I can posit a truly random 50/50 outcome.

This is a very interesting topic, but I'm not gonna play if we aren't going to talk about the actual paradox.

[quote]We run into this problem because for the Being to predict the future, when you are put into this situation, the box has already been determined, or so it seems, so for the being to be right, it seems as though your decision affects its past decision of deciding whether the money should be in the box or not in the first place.[/quote] \r\n\r\nIt hasn't been determined. That's not part of the setup. The problem comes in the form of how we use decision theory to make a decision.\r\n\r\n[quote]I would shake the closed box.[/quote] \r\n\r\nThis, too, is missing the point of the thought experiment. You are to choose base on the evidence you have. The reason the box is closed is so that you can't assess a confidence level on the contents of the box.\r\n\r\n[quote]the result is based upon character[/quote] \r\n\r\nNot based on character. Based on decision theory.\r\n\r\n\r\nAll of these issues you guys are raising aren't pertinent to the paradox. As I said, you need to understand decision theory to see how this paradox fits in.\r\nWe could talk in circles all day about, say, Russell's Paradox. But unless you understand logic and set theory, it's not going to be fruitful discussion. A solution to the paradox would be one that uses decision theory that avoids the paradox while not succumbing to other standard problems.\r\n\r\n[quote]combining SchrÃ�Â¶dinger's cat with Newcomb's problem[/quote] \r\n\r\nThe Schrodinger's Cat thought experiment is a reductio of certain interpretations of quantum phenomena. It is not some sort of random number generator, if that's what you're looking for.\r\nA coin flip, philosophically speaking, is merely an event with an outcome space of 2 (heads, tails) and that has evenly distributed probability - 50/50. If Newcomb gets to posit a supercomputer that can predict human behavior, then I can posit a truly random 50/50 outcome.\r\n\r\nThis is a very interesting topic, but I'm not gonna play if we aren't going to talk about the actual paradox.

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