Uhm, thanks master. donosld and I are having quite a constructive conversation here:
If your thoughts and actions are under no influence of your physical environment, and they will in no way influence your physical environment, then it can be deemed as conscious thought.
This requires something akin to a Platonic dualist conception of being to make any sense and I find this extremely problematic. Do you notice that you're making an arbitrary distinction on what is a '
hysical environment' and what isn't? You further realise that by extension, if you stick to these kinds of premises you can't rely on talking about imaging techniques such as FMRI to reflect degrees of functionality, since the premise of the purported efficacy of such techniques is a necessary relation between physical and behavioral traits?
Reacting to a 'green traffic light' has nothing to do with making decisions based on 'non-physical stimuli' because in my opinion, strictly in the context of this discussion, that phrase is not meaningful. At the best one could say that we are
modulating our "lower-order" processes. If anything that's what a "higher-order" process would be, and I have further words to say on this matter if need be- at this point it's only tangentially relevant.
But let's be clear, I'm not a physical reductionist. To this end my arguments are compatible with monism, which bypasses said problem and is therefore a more powerful model.
I realise that while I've cited Dennett, I haven't given you my own definition of consciousness. That's because I believe there is no single definition (same applies to such concepts as 'life'
, but I can make a generalised statement: that consciousness is a self-fulfilling feature; it compels one to believe they are conscious. I believe this effectively bypasses the 'hard problems' of consciousness that I mentioned earlier and as of yet I'm not convinced you've navigated sufficiently: I am no longer obliged to look for some kind of function or trigger, or the equivalent of the Higgs-Boson (in other words, possibly a wild-goose chase). In the moral sense I also don't get caught up in superfluous free-will arguments. Therefore I no longer have to make qualified statements like these:
I mean my definition in a very broad, within one standard deviation sense
Which just seem inelegant. This is one place where I believe Ockam's razor is a good starting point. In a nutshell, we are
always being exposed to environmental stimuli by definition, regardless of whether we're salivating at a burger or arguing about the import of consciousness on animal rights.
But we've slightly digressed:
Anyways to address your point, why is it unreasonable to expect those who we grant rights to to be able to understand and enforce them upon themselves?
As I said before, it's not necessarily
unreasonable in some kind of sense (you can reason your way into nearly anything if you're good/bad enough), but it is
more reasonable, IMO, to view rights as...well I'm going to be more precise here...a social tool that represents the formal acknowledgment of moral sentiment.
There are two things I want to communicate at this point. One is a reiteration, the other is a development.
1) It's all well and good to argue that as stated, rights are only discussed and 'understood' by humans. It would be perfectly reasonable if the
effects of rights were only restricted to humans. But they don't have to be. It makes more sense to me to talk therefore about rights in their domain of effect, and then perhaps make a distinction about which ones are exclusively human. The very reason that we're discussing this now is because rights also reflect the social state. You could say that advocates for animal rights are primarily motivated by being able to empathise or relate to certain animal species due to the commonalities in our behaviors, hence those animal rights are definitely relevant to those humans.
Short version: rights are relevant to far more than those who can understand them in (approximately) the parameters they were conceived. Properly used, they shape the social conscience and advocate social responsibility, a pillar of cohabitation.
2) The new point: previously I spoke of "granting rights" which is accurate in a legal sense. However it is now important that I point out one other thing- what engenders rights? It's not as if we 'talk' about rights and then they pop into existence. These are merely the acknowledgment of cultural sentiments (as I alluded to above) which reflect upon the thrust of my previous argument: there is no concrete differentiation between the stimuli and our responses and that 'magical' or 'distinctive' consciousness. The same goes for rights- talk of that is merely that: talk, the domain of humans.
This reflects upon why I asserted you do not understand animal behavior. Because if you did understand them, I believe you would have to acknowledge that despite your quasi-Descartean inclinations, various animal species have varying social networks, and by definition, therefore their own morality and, depending on your definition then, their own 'consciousness'.