So according to thisisnotanalt, the discussion over omnipotence boils down to what you include in everything. If you include the illogical, then an omnipotent being is not possible, but if you don't include the illogical, then an omnipotent being is possible.
So an omnipotent being can do everything that is logical, but if he can't do the illogical then he is not omnipotent. I understand your argument, but it means he can do everything in one area.
So according to thisisnotanalt, the discussion over omnipotence boils down to what you include in everything. If you include the illogical, then an omnipotent being is not possible, but if you don't include the illogical, then an omnipotent being is possible.
No, I'm saying that the paradox of the stone/other arguments with impossible objects aren't good arguments no matter which definition you use. I am making no argument based on the validity of any sort of omnipotent being or anything. Everything I'm saying ties back to the first few pages of the thread when they were talking about if God can create a rock he can't lift, and I was arguing that that argument doesn't work under either definition of omnipotence, and now I'm caught up in explaining that there are in fact multiple definitions of omnipotence while also trying to re-explain my argument because people are missing the point of what I'm saying and thinking I'm arguing about the possibility of the existence of God or any other omnipotent being.
So an omnipotent being can do everything that is logical, but if he can't do the illogical then he is not omnipotent. I understand your argument, but it means he can do everything in one area.
Under Aquinas' definition, being able to do everything logically possible and nothing logically impossible satisfies all conditions needed for omnipotence, whereas in Descartes' definition it is required that a being be able to do EVERYTHING for it to be omnipotent.
I'd just like to say here that I don't think the definition given here of Descartes' idea of omnipotence is correct. During the Meditations, Descartes does posit that an evil demon could be deceiving him about something as basic as 2+5=7. But he dismisses this worry shortly thereafter. In fact, it would seem that Descartes' god is cannot be a deceiver, because he would fail to be perfect. Descartes' proof of the external world relies on this fact: that God is not a deceiver. Now there is certainly a difference between God's not doing something and not being able to do something. But when push comes to shove, Descartes would have to say that God, by His nature, cannot be a deceiver.
And really, what's the harm in God not being able to do things that are logically impossible? Is that really a sleight against His omnipotence? Besides, there are far more worrisome arguments against God's existence.
if there are only certain things(powers,abilities,etc) w/in the realm of possibility of (i don't know...logic maybe...or just ax out this parenthesis altogether) being acheived... and a being has w/in his faculties the ability to do all things possible then what would you call that?
if omnipotence is being all powerful ....and this supposed being has all of the powers that are possible then does that not by definition make that being all powerful?...and maybe therefore omnipotent?
