Forums → WEPR → The Religion Debate Thread

Changing, designing, whatever. Maybe it's not that simple.

Just because He knew they would fail doesn't mean it was a sham.

What if God did make us morally perfect just like Him? There would be nothing to compare with his own perfection.

We certainly would not have the free will to choose whatever we want anymore. That also means God has no free will. But so what if God has no free will? He doesn't have to answer to anyone, so His actions don't matter. He could be a puppet for all we know, but at least we know God chooses good everytime.

And He's not going to design us to be perfect because that means we don't have free will anymore.

That makes it seem like God is under the influence of a paradox of a perfect being then.

So you're essentially doomed to eternal ****ation if God declines to do that for you?

Yes.

I never said anything about predetermination, that's for sure. Let me redirect you back to R. C. Sproul. Here.

If those desires are determined, would it be safe to say that the consequences of those desires are also determined. Because all of our desires are evil according to God, we are all destined for hell.

I would still say He's perfectly just because He knows we deserve hell.

Yes, you can see that I am still trying to figure this all out myself.

Truly, this is the pinnacle of lenience and forgiveness.

Actually, this is just definition 2 hidden behind a bunch of buzzwords. Sproul incorrectly interprets determinism as being driven by purely external forces, then defines "self-determination" in purely deterministic terms.

Therefore, humans are still not morally accountable under this definition.

Precisely as God planned.

He doesn't have to design us to be perfect; He should at least design His tests to be passable.

At this point I think it's reasonable to say that we both know that isn't true.

Also, before you object, I'd like to point out that the type of free will you described and the simulation I described are different in name only.

I can't tell if this is sarcasm.

To God, our actions and the intentions (may be compared to desires maybe) for those actions still have consequences. We are considered to be "accountable" because of this justice system.

Well, I have no idea because my idea about free will has changed and so I still have to adapt my thinking.

Are you saying God should lower his standards?

Actually, I'm confused :/

That is not a justice system. Yes, actions have consequences (otherwise, there would be no point in doing them), but intentions are determined by desired outcomes, and actions are based on intentions.

At least the standards that He holds fallible mortals to, since demanding perfection from imperfect beings is about as sensible as demanding moustaches from frogs.

If those desires are determined, would it be safe to say that the consequences of those desires are also determined. Because all of our desires are evil according to God, we are all destined for hell.

You're asking some amazing questions, lozerfac3. I wish my students were this thoughtful and insightful when I teach sub-honours courses.

So the quick answer: yes, the consequences of our desires are just as determined as our desires are. This is true of a deterministic world. Remember--every event has a cause. That's the central claim of determinism. So the consequences of desires are events, which are part of the deterministic chain of causes.

This is where things get really interested and also really complicated. If someone is concerned about the nature of free will, then this is where they're going to start making moves. (For what it's worth, there are people who deny determinism in order to rescue free will. In my opinion, this move in unmotivated. You can't reject something that seems obviously true just because you don't like the conclusion it leads to. This, by the way, is along the lines of Richard Taylor's response to an even stronger notion: fatalism. (NB Richard Taylor is now an agency theorist, as far as I know.))

I'm bringing all this up so that I can mention agency theory, which (a) I don't fully understand, and (b) you might like. As another quick aside, I'm wondering why it is that you think that all our desires are evil? It seems like when we help people, for example, we do so out of a desire to do so. And that seems to be a morally good desires. (Typing that made be cringe, because it's weird to think about desires as having a moral status. Typically we talk about desires in terms of moral worth or along consequentialist lines in terms of ethical value.)

But here's a fairly modern--and potentially very clever--way of rescuing the free will thesis. Remember that, for Hume (and Sproul, for that matter) we just stop looking at the causal chain when we hit an agent's desires. It's not like we're saying that those desires don't have an external cause. Its more like we just don't care. It's the stuff that's 'inside your skin' that determines your moral character. Maybe you were abused as a child and, as a result, you murder prostitutes. "Tough cookies," they would say. Your desire to murder a prostitute was your own and now you're morally responsible for doing so (this got kind of dark, sorry). The worry about this move is that we don't seem to have any sort of ethical or metaphysical reason to stop looking at the causal chain when we reach someone's desires. It's sort of like if your mom said "Because I said so" but you really want to know why she said so. There must be a reason, but that line of questioning is blocked for whatever reason. It just doesn't seem right.

Enter agency theory. This still accepts determinism, but with the recognition that some events can be (for lack of a better word) self-caused. (Again, this isn't quite right because I don't fully understand the theory. In my defense, plenty of people who support the theory also don't seem to understand it, either.) In short, there are agent events--these are events that are brought about by an agent (someone with intentions, desires, intelligence, etc.). And agents can actually cause themselves to act. This is bringing a literal meaning to the phrase "Make yourself get out of bed in the morning."

This has two really interesting consequences for a theistic position. First, we can rescue free will in a completely deterministic universe and in a way that may be compatible with God's omniscience. Second, you can make a (potentially dubious) move and say that the creation of the universe was an agent event. After all, God is certainly an agent (assuming He exists) and, given some of the key aspects of God (omnipresence, for example), the theist is in a position to block the infinite chain of causes argument. The move "Well, what caused God" doesn't seem to apply because God is simply agency, and agency can be self-caused.

Kind of sexy. Really dubious. But also really interesting, I think. It's also (as far as I know) compatible with a Calvinist view of predestination.

Based on the google definition, morality is the principles concerning the distinction of right and wrong or good and bad behavior. God's morals are the standard. They are also perfect. Ultimately, God decides what is good or bad behavior.

Our morals differ from God because we have lost touch with God; we want to make compromises in our morals to fit our new desired outcomes, which are now to disobey God.

Even though there you are not directly trying to disobey God, you were taught to live with a set of morals that are different from God's.

Still, his morals are the standard, so He still gets to inflict punishment for anything that He says is bad behavior.

Remember that, for Hume (and Sproul, for that matter) we just stop looking at the causal chain when we hit an agent's desires. It's not like we're saying that those desires don't have an external cause. Its more like we just don't care. It's the stuff that's 'inside your skin' that determines your moral character. Maybe you were abused as a child and, as a result, you murder prostitutes. "Tough cookies," they would say. Your desire to murder a prostitute was your own and now you're morally responsible for doing so (this got kind of dark, sorry).

Enter agency theory. This still accepts determinism, but with the recognition that some events can be (for lack of a better word) self-caused. (Again, this isn't quite right because I don't fully understand the theory. In my defense, plenty of people who support the theory also don't seem to understand it, either.) In short, there are agent events--these are events that are brought about by an agent (someone with intentions, desires, intelligence, etc.). And agents can actually cause themselves to act.

They still need a reason, meaning that it cannot be purely self-caused, and that reason is always traceable to external factors. At the very least, this theory represents a causal oversimplification.

This is the part of agency theory that's really unsatisfying to me, but also makes me feel like I just don't understand the theory properly. But I'm wondering if the following might be a little more satisfying to you.

So you're right that an agent needs a reason to act and that this reason can be traced to external factors. The agency theorist, I don't think, would deny this. The difference is that the external stuff is an explanation of the agent's mental state. In other words, the relationship here is an explanatory one, not a causal one.

What's the difference? Well, suppose that Sarah has a crippling fear of water. She won't go near a pool and you can forget about taking her to the beach or on a boat. It ain't happening. Sarah's fear comes from something that happened to her when she just 3 or 4 years old. She was riding in her father's boat when she fell overboard. Fortunately, she had on a life jacket, but it scared the absolute crap out of little Sarah. To this day, she feels anxiety when she even looks at a picture of water as those extreme emotions start to come back.

What we have here is an explanation of Sarah's mental state (or, at least, part of her mental state). We can also explain why she would decline to go on a fishing trip, for example. That terrifying incident explains why she doesn't want to go fishing. But that incident didn't cause her to decline to go fishing. Instead, the stuff inside her skin and skull caused that decision. And that's precisely what agency is!

Now, you might want to push the point here and say that the boat incident did cause her to not go fishing. We look at her mental state, her desires, and track what caused those desires. Ultimately, we trace those causes back to the incident in question. So, it's still part of the causal chain.

But suppose that incident never actually happened. Suppose that she dreamed it when she was little, but the dream was so terrifying and so visceral that it impacted her significantly. At such a young age, she was unable to distinguish the fear that came from a dream from real-life danger and this dream somehow made its way into her psychological makeup. (This, by the way, isn't a far-fetched story. In fact, I've spoken with people who have had a fear of something precisely because of this kind of scenario. What's interesting is that they can't shake that fear, even though they have since learned that the incident never actually happened.)

With this modification, it looks like our causal story breaks down. An event that never actually happened can't be the cause of some other event--that would be silly. Now, you might say that Sarah's dream is the cause of her fear. Story over. But this dream is something that took place inside her skull. It's now an internal cause. And what's more, it's one that doesn't seem to have an obvious cause.

There are still objections to this story as I've told it. But let's step back for a second and look at what agency theory says and, for that matter, what agency is. To be an agent entails moral responsibility. It also entails intentionality, desires, and certain mental states. So the agency theorist is looking at agents at being self-efficacious. That is, agents can make themselves do things (even if they don't really want to). The upshot is that it looks similar to the Humean move of stopping the causal chain at the point of desire. But now, it seems like we have a principled response as to why we stop there. Since agency is the sort of thing that is self-efficacious, there's no need to look beyond the internal stuff as part of the causal chain. In fact, everything outside of you (for the most part, at least) bears an explanatory, rather than causal, relationship with an agent's actions.

But that incident didn't cause her to decline to go fishing. Instead, the stuff inside her skin and skull caused that decision. And that's precisely what agency is!

Now, you might want to push the point here and say that the boat incident did cause her to not go fishing.

Now, you might say that Sarah's dream is the cause of her fear. Story over. But this dream is something that took place inside her skull. It's now an internal cause. And what's more, it's one that doesn't seem to have an obvious cause.

So the agency theorist is looking at agents at being self-efficacious. That is, agents can make themselves do things (even if they don't really want to).

In fact, everything outside of you (for the most part, at least) bears an explanatory, rather than causal, relationship with an agent's actions.

I'm still here. I'm just thinking of something that will blow your mind haha

@lozerfac3 It has been two days and my mind is still intact

Yeah its gonna be a while. Be assured. I will be back.

@lozerfac3
There's one thing I wanted to show you, but forgot. It's a video by DarkMatter2525 on a believer's relationship with God. I know you're not keen about atheist youtubers, but he makes a point that I find compelling, and even though I am not now claiming that this is how it really is, I find that it would make sense.

Link to video

I also recently read an article that I think indirectly supports his point; it's about so-called bereavement hallucinations, hearing the voice of recently-deceased loved ones. I know it's not the same topic, but both are ultimately about perception of reality.

Link to article

I just wanted to have your opinion on that. You will most certainly disagree, but maybe it can spark a little discussion.

My first thought when watching the video was that he makes a very good point. I think that some theists, especially Christians, feel as if it is their job to bring people to God when it is actually God who is the one who brings those people to Him. They feel like they fail if people are not automatically converted. I definitely disagree that God is just a character we make up for ourselves, or myself at least. It might be the case for the Christians who take atheists' skepticism personally. They are probably not making up God for themselves but they are making up characteristics of God that are contrary to what God actually is.

I think that some theists, especially Christians, feel as if it is their job to bring people to God when it is actually God who is the one who brings those people to Him.

I definitely disagree that God is just a character we make up for ourselves, or myself at least.

Do you think the same way about missionaries?

The question is, how can you be sure? When you communicate with your God (I assume you do), how can you be certain that it is not your brain reconstructing a being that you expect to be here, the same way that the brain reconstructs our whole environment based on external and, in the example of bereavement hallucinations, internal stimuli?