Not to detract too much from the conversation at hand, but I was wondering @lozerfac3 how you would respond to the classic Euthyphro dilemma. If you're already familiar with it, I'm sorry for the extended explanation. Though I will try to frame it in more modern (and relevant) terminology. So, even if you are familiar with the argument, it might be worth reading.
This is a dilemma specifically for Divine Command Theory (DCT) and is framed (as most dilemmas are) as two options, each of which is problematic.
The claim: An action is morally correct if it is commanded by God. It is incorrect if it is forbidden by God.
Shorter version: What is right is what it commanded by God.
Let's focus on the shorter version because (1) it's easier to engage with, and (2) the problems for it equally apply to the longer version. So, let's go!
The question here is why something is right. What makes an action morally correct? The answer, it seems, is that God commands it--that's what makes it right. But this doesn't seem to be very satisfying. What we're really asking is *why* it's correct. Sure, you can say that it's right because God commands it, but this misses the point. We're wondering why God commands it. Put another way, the claim of DCT tells us an equivalence relationship between morally correct acts and God's commandments. But what we're really asking is about the explanatory relationship between the two.
This leaves us with 2 options to respond and, as we'll see, both options are problematic (thus, the dilemma).
Option 1: An action is right because God commands it.
On this view, what explains morally correct actions is God Himself. God is the source of morality and so whatever He commands is morally correct.
But notice this doesn't exactly answer the question. Why did God choose to command X instead of Y? And, had He chosen to command Y, then that would have morally correct. So, for example, if God had commanded us to steal whatever we needed, then that action would have been morally correct.
This option makes morality completely contingent and, in fact, completely arbitrary on God's whims. It doesn't explain *why* God chose X over Y--it simply can't explain that! There is no more to the story of morality beyond what God just so happened to decide. And, it's important to keep in mind here, that God could not have had any moral reason whatsoever for choosing X over Y. That's because, prior to His choosing, morality didn't even exist. So, when we call morality arbitrary, it really very much is. God had no reason for choosing what to command or why. This is an odd result.
Option 2: God commands an action because it is right.
This option 'feels' a lot better to most people. If forced to choose, most people choose this option. But it's also very problematic and doesn't answer the question.
Notice that, on this view, morality is independent of God. Sure, He's very good at identifying morally correct actions for us and then commanding those things. But it doesn't actually explain why they're good--it just explains why God picked those actions.
At the end of the day, this doesn't offer any more explanation than Option 1. All it says is that God is really good at tracking morally correct actions and then commanding those things. It doesn't say why those actions are right.
The upshot is that, on either view, we don't really have an explanation of why an action is right. But this is precisely what DCT set out to answer--why is a right action right! According to DCT, either morality is completely arbitrary (so is simply is no explanation) or morality is independent of God (which moves the question back, but doesn't actually answer it). Thus, DCT doesn't actually give us a satisfying answer to the question we were after. And this is extremely problematic for the view.
